PHNOM PENH, Cambodia (AP) - Southeast Asian nations are putting on a brave face as they seek closer ties to China with a free trade deal. But they may not have much choice.

Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji met Monday with leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and signed a framework intended to liberalize trade within a decade, driving down tariffs and spurring investment.

The free-trade area would have a combined market of 1.8 billion people and a gross domestic product of at least $2 trillion.

That may sound good for all concerned, but ASEAN members recognize that China has the upper hand in attracting outside investment.

The trade deal is just one area where the world's most populous nation is bringing its power to the forefront in this region, leaving many worried about how much clout Beijing ultimately will end up with.

Critics say development money handed out by Beijing is impossible to account for, and its projects on the Mekong River, which flows through five nations after leaving China, could bring profound and possibly unwanted changes to the environment.

They may not like it, but the ASEAN nations, many of them still developing, find themselves tagging along behind giant China in what they hope won't turn out to be a harmful undertow.

Many are reluctant to say so publicly, however.

Despite widespread concerns about Chinese dams in the Mekong River, which will affect flows to Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand and Myanmar, there was apparently no criticism leveled at Beijing during a meeting on Sunday of the six members of the Greater Mekong Subregion grouping.

"We are fully conscious that China is a superpower," a senior official with Cambodia's Ministry of the Environment said afterward. "Maintaining economic ties with it is very important."

China is a big donor to Cambodia. It provides water wells in the countryside and built a major annex to the National Assembly compound. Traffic lights around Phnom Penh were funded by loans from Beijing, and Cambodia's King Sihanouk flies to China for regular medical checkups while maintaining a palace there, all provided at no charge.

But social activists wonder what the payback will be, and they are blunt in their criticisms that China keeps silent about where all its money goes as it builds increasingly greater influence.

"Everyone is afraid to stand up to China in this region," said Aviva Imhof, of the U.S.-based International Rivers Network, on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit that wraps up here on Tuesday.

International lenders like the World Bank might be viewed as evil institutions by the enemies of economic globalization, but at least there is more accountability about where the money goes, activists say.

China has said that a China-ASEAN free trade agreement would bring about a 50 percent increase in exports on both sides. It is expected to add one percentage point to annual economic growth in the ASEAN countries and 0.3 percent in China.

Even as China and the 10 ASEAN members signed a deal late Monday outlining a timetable for a free trade zone to be set up over the next decade, Japan was trying to provide a counterbalance with its own free trade package or packages.

Earlier Monday, China proposed to Japan and South Korea that they establish a three-way deal. They agreed to let private-sector experts study the feasibility, a Japanese official said.

China can produce most things more cheaply than rivals in Southeast Asia, and while they fear the loss of investment money, the ASEAN nations are hoping the free trade deal will at least open Chinese markets to the goods they can offer.

"China is seen as frightening figure," said Yutaka Aoki, a senior official at the Japanese Embassy here.

"China's economy has been booming, and its population of 1.3 billion makes a huge market, compared to some 500 million for all of ASEAN combined," Aoki said. "ASEAN members fear that China may take away foreign investment, and they see China as a major competitor rather than a partner."

Noting China's huge advantages, an ASEAN study released Monday said the region's "small, fragmented markets are not attractive to investors compared to the large Chinese market and more integrated regions elsewhere in the world."

Zhu insisted later the deal will be good for all.

"Nearly a year after China's entry into the WTO, facts have shown that economic growth in China has not come about at the expense of the development of others," Zhu said. "On the contrary, it has become an important pillar and stimulus to the East Asian economy as a whole."

PHNOM PENH (Reuters) - China and Southeast Asia signed a deal on Monday to give birth to the biggest free trade zone on earth, encompassing more than 1.7 billion people struggling to attain prosperity after centuries mired in poverty.

"I would say that this is one of the most significant agreements to be signed this year anywhere in the world," Rodolfo Severino, secretary general of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), said earlier.

Another landmark accord underscored China's foray to mend fences when it signed a deal with its southern neighbours to avoid conflict over the disputed Spratly islands in the South China Sea over which Beijing has come to the brink of war with Vietnam and the Philippines several times in recent years.

The deals culminated a day of talks among the 10 ASEAN members as well as China, South Korea and Japan that was dominated by a declaration condemning militant violence as a threat not only to people but to prosperity.

Reeling from last month's bombing on the paradise Indonesian island of Bali, leaders of some of the world's most populous Muslim nations urged the international community not to issue warnings against travel to countries increasingly reliant on tourism or to blame specific religious groups.

DON'T PICK ON PEOPLE

"We deplore the tendency in some quarters to identify terrorism with particular religious or ethnic groups," an ASEAN statement said.

With participants agreeing that the war on terror had become an essential ingredient of prosperity, leaders turned their attention to ways to boost trade and foster economic integration. The China agreement fitted the bill.

"Facts have shown that economic growth in China has not come about at the expense of the development of others," Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji told the meeting, pre-empting a growing chorus of concern that the Chinese behemoth could swamp its neighbours.

Negotiations on the Southeast Asia-China free trade area with a potential combined market of 1.7 billion people will start next year. China and ASEAN have a combined gross domestic product of $1.5 trillion to $2.0 trillion.

The free trade area that will stretch from the frozen steppes of China's northern Mongolia region to the palm-fringed beaches of Indonesia will be the largest in the world.

However, stumbling blocks lie in its path, including fears among several Southeast Asian nations that their fading tiger economies risk being swallowed up by the dynamic China dragon.

Analysts said one aim of the agreement was to enable China to sideline once-mighty Japan, and position its rapidly growing industries not only to expand trade to the south but to increase overseas investment as China moves from exporter to importer and from cheap manufacturing source to higher-end buyer.

DEAL, BUT WHERE'S THE INTEGRATION?

The deal comes as current efforts to set up an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) have lost their way.

"It is critical for ASEAN to know its destination and which path will take it there at the crucial crossroads in its history," Severino told the leaders in a swansong speech.

"Regional economic integration seems to have become stuck in framework agreements, work programmes and master plans," he raged in a thinly veiled reference to the deal with China.

The reluctance of some countries to make changes had stalled integration of the entire group, he told leaders in the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh. He did not identify the member states.

ASEAN groups Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

Under AFTA, six of the 10 ASEAN nations are due to cut tariffs next year to between zero and five percent on all but a few goods traded in the region. The four less developed members are to reduce tariffs over the next decade.

The summit aims to promote economic integration, tackle terror and paper over cracks that perennially open up among 10 states that range from impoverished Laos to oil-rich Brunei and giant Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation.

But officials at the talks, in a plush hotel surrounded by tight security in streets where the Khmer Rouge launched their "Killing Fields" genocide three decades ago, said leaders evinced few signs of understanding each other's positions.

The issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons programme nudged its way onto the agenda when the prime ministers of China, Japan and South Korea urged the group to join tough talk to urge the unpredictable communist state to abandon its ambitions.

Rare unanimity was also achieved in the war on terror.

"We call on the international community to avoid indiscriminately advising their citizens to refrain from visiting ...in the absence of established evidence to substantiate rumours of possible terrorist attacks," ASEAN said in its declaration.

The United States is among the many countries that have urged citizens not to visit Indonesia. It has withdrawn families of embassy staff from the country, citing fears of more attacks.

A statement on tourism pledged cooperation among law enforcement agencies to protect visitors seeking sun and sand.

The group also vowed to set up a regional counter-terrorism centre in the Malaysian capital, Kuala Lumpur, but said individual groups should not be singled out.

PHNOM PENH (Reuters) - China will sign a landmark agreement with Southeast Asian countries next week on avoiding conflict in the disputed South China Sea, a top official said on Saturday.

A dispute over ownership of the Spratly islands, claimed entirely or in part by China and several Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, is seen as a potential flashpoint and has brought China and Vietnam to the verge of war.

The leaders of ASEAN and China will sign the deal to govern the conduct of parties in the South China Sea at a meeting in Phnom Penh that gets under way on Monday, said ASEAN Secretary General Rodolfo Severino.

"This declaration that will be issued will embody the measures the countries are taking to avoid the disputes erupting into conflict," he told reporters.

"We have reached a kind of breakthrough with the conclusion of the discussions on a kind of a set of behavioural norms that should govern the behaviour of parties pending the settlement of the jurisdictional and territorial questions."

A copy of the draft agreement seen by Reuters said claimants would practise self-restraint in activity that could spark disputes, such as inhabiting the islands that are believed to be rich in oil deposits.

They will also agree to exchange views between defence officials and give advance warning of military exercises.

VAST OIL DEPOSITS

The Spratlys are a cluster of dozens of submerged banks, reefs and islets in the South China Sea claimed wholly by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam.

Except for China and Taiwan, which both have permanent installations on the remote reefs, the other claimants are all ASEAN members.

The islands are believed to sit atop vast deposits of oil and natural gas but clashes between Vietnam and China in the 1990s and the presence of numerous naval vessels patrolling the seas have made verification difficult.

The meeting in Cambodia on Monday and Tuesday will be attended by leaders of the 10-nation ASEAN, as well as by China, Japan, South Korea, India and South Africa.

Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji arrived in Cambodia on Friday and made a flying tourism visit to the fabled temple complex of Angkor Wat before returning to Phnom Penh for meetings.

After years of wrangling, talks on a code of conduct for the Spratlys gathered pace at an ASEAN meeting in Brunei earlier this year, but a dispute over wording between Malaysia and Vietnam scuppered a deal.

Officials have said that the dispute over wording has since been settled, paving the way for the agreement next week.

BEIJING, Sept. 27 (Xinhuanet) -- Along the several thousand kilometers of the Sino-Vietnamese border, Dongxing city, a 400-year-old treaty port, stands out as one of the busiest trade portsin southwest China.

Cargo ships from the two countries berth on docks of the city's boundary river of Beilun, exchanging goods including textiles, household appliances, daily necessities, seafood and rubber products.

At the same time, high-pitched bargaining can be heard in many accents of both Vietnamese and Chinese.

The number of tourists to and from China across the Beilun Bridge can reach up to 5,000 a day.

Within the city proper, vehicles and people are bustling on streets both new and a century old.

"Thanks to the friendly neighboring relationship with bordering nations, the economy of border lands in southwest China has bottomed out and is becoming increasingly brisker," Li Hong, an expert with Guangxi University on the study of Southeast Asia, said.

One citizen, Peng Min, remembers well that in 1979, the city had only three streets whose combined area was merely 0.8 square kilometers.

"But now, there are more than 60 streets, and the city proper's size has multiplied by as much as six times," Peng said.

Since Sino-Vietnamese border trade officially began in 1990, nearly 40 percent of the city's revenue was generated by border trades whose total volume has reached 6.429 billion yuan (about 774.6 million US dollars).

Besides, the thriving border trade also attracted investors and traders from more developed regions such as Guangdong, Zhejiang, Hong Kong and Taiwan.

Nguyen Thi Hong, a businesswoman from Vietnam, said, "China's industrial products, from motorcycles to porcelain cups, are welcomed by the Vietnamese. Some of them even have been transported to Cambodia."

"As border trading transactions can now be settled with banks on both sides, the inconvenience formerly incurred by carrying large stacks of cash has been avoided," she said.

According to city Mayor Li Guidong, Dongxing has maintained an annual growth rate of 19 percent in its gross domestic product (GDP) since 1996.

Last year, the city's GDP reached 180 million US dollars and some 500,000 Chinese have been found going through the port to Ha Long Vihn of Vietnam for sightseeing, a number nearly five times more than the whole population of Dongxing.

Available statistics show that the city has 1,100 industrial and commercial enterprises now, of which 26 are joint ventures specializing in real estate, tourism, processing and border trades.

After China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) proposed the Free Trade Area agreement last November, two new land boundary markers were set up separately in Dongxing city and the neighboring Maojie of Vietnam.

Being the only city in southern China sharing both land and sea borders with an ASEAN member, Dongxing has become the most convenient land and sea port in southeast Asia.

So far, the regional government of Guangxi has invested a total of 2.07 billion yuan (about 249 million US dollars) on the city's infrastructure construction.

"Under the West Development Strategy, the border lands in southwest China stand as a bridge to further boost the cultural and economic exchanges between China and ASEAN countries, and these lands can anticipate a golden future," Li Hong said. Enditem

The writer is a research assistant in the China Studies Department of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York

When the Asean Regional Forum, or ARF, met this summer to discuss security concerns facing the Asia-Pacific region, not surprisingly, terrorism, Kashmir and the Korean peninsula dominated the agenda. Sadly, unresolved territorial claims to the Spratly Islands, an increasingly volatile flashpoint, received only token consideration. The continual lack of substantial progress on this issue threatens to march East Asia closer to disaster.

Rich in minerals, oil, natural gas and fish, the sea lanes of the South China Sea--passage for one-quarter of global trade--are an attractive prize for the six players with claims to the Spratlys: Brunei, China, Malaysia, Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines. An outbreak of conflict would impact every member of the Asia-Pacific community and would have a negative rippling effect on the global economy. Thankfully, clashes among those in Southeast Asia have been very minor and needn't be much fretted about.

The primary source of concern is China. China's "creeping assertiveness" into the 200 islets and reefs, along with its unwillingness to negotiate multilaterally, has left the other claimants with little recourse. In 1995, China built a small "outpost" on Mischief Reef--the Pentagon argues that it bears the look of a future military installation--that has since led to periodic skirmishes between China and both Vietnam and the Philippines. Just recently, Vietnam accused China of conducting military exercises with live ammunition in Vietnamese waters.

Yet, at the moment, international attention has strayed from issues involving the South China Sea. Already frequently avoided or shelved, the dispute in the area is difficult to discuss given the differing diplomatic styles of the states involved. In particular, China does not easily consent to Southeast Asia's multilateral approach because of its sensitivity to national sovereignty. China did agree to approach the issue multilaterally in 1995--itself a huge achievement--but in every attempt at progress since, Beijing has nonetheless emerged as the main impediment.

In principle, the claimants have agreed on a code of conduct that would govern movements in the region, but this has yet to emerge in practice because of China's consistent disagreements over certain clauses. Working with China in a regional forum understandably is a slow process, but as issues over the South China Sea are downplayed, China feels less pressured to accommodate any external demand. But as time passes and more parties build "outposts," compromise will become more difficult as it will necessitate withdrawal and loss of face.

As the Chinese stake their claims it has been equally hard to rein these in, so efforts have centred on "confidence-building." But this has yielded limited results. Resources and the steadfast defence of national sovereignty fuel the dispute, international law struggles to make sense of the claims--China's is based on "archaeological" evidence that supposedly proves the islands were always a part of the Chinese "motherland"--and regional discussions avoid the debate for fear of halting progress elsewhere.

Yet for all that, the South China Sea must be made a higher priority. The international community has learned that China will participate in policy or dialogue when it perceives enough self-benefit. In the Spratlys, however, China's intentions involve both resources and rank. Accordingly, to entice it to the table, negotiations must appeal to China's desire for a leadership role in Asia.

Perhaps then it would be feasible to convince China of proposals to share the resources of the area rather than assert military might over all of it. In other words, the goal is to get China to agree on cooperation that would result in joint development and joint benefactors, instead of focusing on intransigence.

As the Spratlys simmer on the back burner, other problems grab the spotlight. This has happened before. Challenges like terrorism were not addressed appropriately when first identified; now they have greatly intensified and handling them will cost governments far more than it initially would have. If China's expansionist tendencies are not checked, the Spratlys will one day join this list of issues that rightly should have attracted more early attention. Unfortunately, restoring peace following an eruption in the South China Sea would be extremely costly.

HANOI (AFP) - Vietnam has published the details of its 1999 land border agreement with communist rival China, breaking its silence over a treaty that has drawn much flak at home for acceding too many territorial concessions.

The agreement, signed in December 1999, more than 20 years after their brief but bloody border war in 1979, was reproduced on the website of the Communist Party mouthpiece, the Nhan Dan (People).

"It was first published on August 29 after the editors instructed us to put it on the page," a journalist at the newspaper's online edition said Monday, requesting anonymity.

Its publication has received no publicity in the print edition of the daily nor among other state-controlled newspapers.

However, the English-language Vietnam News ran a lengthy interview on its front page Monday with Deputy Foreign Minister Le Cong Phung, in which he dismissed criticism from "reactionary forces and political opportunists" that Hanoi had ceded large tracts of land to China.

No mention was made of the treaty's online publication.

Analysts said the decision to release the text of the agreement was probably taken to appease dissidents who have criticised the authorities for giving up too much land to China and not revealing the details of the treaty.

Senior editors at the Nhan Dan and officials at the Ministry of Culture and Information were not immediately available for comment.

Ideological soulmates but historical rivals, China invaded Vietnam in February 1979, following Hanoi's intervention in Cambodia in December 1978 to oust Beijing's Khmer Rouge allies.

The pair came to blows again in 1988 in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, when nearly 90 Vietnamese sailors were killed during a brief sea battle.

The diplomatic frost thawed in 1991 when they restored official relations. Negotiations kicked off two years later over their disputed boundaries.

However, the land border treaty was only agreed upon after six years of torturous talks, which were complicated by Vietnamese accusations that Chinese troops had moved some 100 border markers during the 1979 conflict.

In December 2000, the two neighbours signed an accord setting out their sea borders in the Gulf of Tonkin, known as Beibu Gulf by the Chinese, but it did not include their conflicting claims to the Spratly and Paracel island chains.

National Security Adviser Roilo Golez yesterday denied a Vietnamese takeover of a rock formation in the Philippine part of the Spratlys. What the Vietnamese occupied, he said, is Pugad Island — and that occupation is now 20 years old.

“The Wescom denied the veracity of news reports regarding reoccupation of Vietnamese forces of Parola Island,” Golez said. The Manila Times ran a story on that report, quoting Foreign Affairs sources. The Times noted that Armed Forces officials had denied the report.

Golez said everything at the Parola Island is business as usual as far as the military is concerned.

He did admit, however, that there had been “sightings” of Vietnamese and even Chinese nationals in the area, but insisted these were only fishermen. “There was nothing unusual in Parola Island except for sightings of Vietnamese and Chinese fishing vessels regularly fishing in the area approximately 800 yards to five nautical miles from Parola,” Golez said.

The Times report quoted the military insisting the visitors were fishermen but cited recent similar events that mushroomed into more serious matters.

Golez said the military leadership is ready to fly members of media in the area for a reconnaissance flight.

Parola Island belongs to the disputed Spratley’s group of islands where at least five countries, the Philippines, China, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam, are claiming territorial jurisdiction over it. The area is a known mineral rich region, where deposits of crude oil had been reported.

In 1988, Burmese voted for democracy and civilian rule. They received neither. In Vietnam, a dissident movement among senior communist cadres and intellectuals calling for more democracy in the party and the government grows in tandem with calls for freedom of worship. In both countries, nothing has happened, because of China. Indeed, by going through the thread of recent history, China must be seen as the main obstacle to democratic reform in mainland Southeast Asia today.

In Burma a military regime generously supported by Beijing has the firm upper hand in deciding how fast it will concede power to Aung San Suu Kyi. In Vietnam, Chinese support for the most stubborn members of the Communist Party has kept Vietnam from taking any step towards democratization. Indeed, should Vietnam begin democratization, similar progress in Laos, over which it has colonial-style protectorate powers, would rapidly follow. And more democracy in Vietnam would deepen support in Cambodia for the rule of law and other conditions sustaining democratic civil society.

But China opposes democratization in Vietnam and Burma and has sufficient influence in their domestic affairs to frustrate progress towards political reform. So much influence, in fact, that China has gained naval access to the Indian Ocean through Burmese coastal stations and has imposed territorial demands on Vietnam. In December 1999, Beijing and Hanoi signed a secret agreement to cede Vietnamese territory to China. A year later, both signed another secret treaty ceding to China rights over former Vietnamese waters in the Gulf of Tonkin. In Burma, the Chinese have built a port and shipyard at Thilawa, near Rangoon. The Irrawaddy River has been dredged to allow for bigger barges to carry goods south from China to this Indian Ocean port. In February, Jiang Zemin demanded more of Vietnam during his Hanoi visit. He wanted Vietnam to expand the port of Vinh to accommodate up to 900 Chinese fishing vessels.

Only very recently has any Chinese government advanced serious claims to the South China Sea. In 1974, China captured the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam. Later, it seized some islands in the Spratley group from Hanoi, built a facility on Mischief Reef in Philippine waters and asserted hegemonic claims of ownership over most of the South China Sea. At the same time, it asserted its influence over Cambodia, fighting a proxy war with Vietnam for control of that country's political destiny. Today, Chinese money is the dominant factor in Cambodia's economy. China also has built roads into northern Burma. The Burmese economy has responded with a new orientation northward, and Chinese businesses are seen throughout northern Burma. In addition, Beijing proposes to improve navigation along the Mekong River to help tie the local economies of northern Thailand and Laos to China for the first time ever.

Never before has a Chinese government been so intrusive in the political and military affairs of its southern neighbours. The Mongol-run Yuan dynasty invaded Burma in the 13th century, but since the departure of the Mongols, China has ignored the country. Admiral Zheng He, a Muslim of Central Asian origin, led splendid 15th-century voyages to Southeast Asia and beyond, but these were a one-off affair, subsequently disowned by the Chinese bureaucracy. Yuan-dynasty invasions of Vietnam ended in defeat, as did a 20-year occupation by the Chinese Ming dynasty. Even the Manchu-run Qing empire generally accepted the mountain ranges dividing Yunnan and Guangxi from Burma, Laos and Vietnam as a limit on their political interests towards the south.

Today's Chinese policy in Southeast Asia is a radical departure from all of prior history. It is a policy of intervention and naval adventurism seeking the subservience of mainland Southeast Asia to Chinese national needs. Accordingly, China patronizes autocracies in Burma and Vietnam. Without this support, the Burmese generals and the Vietnamese Communist Party elite would have compromised with popular demands for change early in the 1990s.

As they assume power later this year, China's new leaders should recognize that Beijing has gone too far in supporting repressive rule in Burma and Vietnam. Indeed, the style of its intrusive actions in Burma and Vietnam derogates the concept of "national sovereignty" that China upholds with such vigour when the shoe is on the other foot. To be a true friend of the Burmese and Vietnamese peoples, China should now stop treating them as subjects, and accord to them the same sort of independence and respect it demands for itself, thus helping them find true modernity, free of outside interference--the very things China seeks for itself.

Note: The writer is president of Winthrop Consulting in St. Paul, Minnesota. Arthur Waldron, director of Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, contributed to this essay

The writer was China's ambassador to Laos in 1994-1995 and to Vietnam in 1995-2000

In China Holds the Indochina Key [June 6], my fellow columnist on this page, Stephen B. Young, says "Beijing and Hanoi signed a secret agreement to cede Vietnamese territory to China," and "another secret treaty ceding to China rights over former Vietnamese waters in the Gulf of Tonkin." Let me state some facts about the three major boundary questions between China and Vietnam: the delimitation of the land boundary, the Beibu Gulf (also known as the Gulf of Tonkin) and sovereign rights over the Nansha islands [also known as the Spratlys].

The land border was delimited between the Qing and French governments at the end of the 19th century when, confined by technological inadequacies of the time, the two left behind some disputed areas. But based on the Sino-French convention and guided by the principles of fairness, equity and through friendly consultations, China and Vietnam rechecked and ratified the boundary and signed the Sino-Vietnamese Convention Concerning the Land Boundary in 1999. As a gulf encircled by mainland China, Hainan and Vietnamese territory, the Beibu Gulf has been owned by both China and Vietnam. It was not delimited until 2000, when the two countries, through negotiations under international laws of the sea and with reference to international practice, signed a convention. These two equitable conventions have laid a solid foundation for the establishment of a boundary that helps maintain prolonged peace and friendship between the two countries, and contribute to consolidating regional peace and stability. Welcomed by both Chinese and Vietnamese people, they also received positive comments from the media in the region.

Young claims that "only very recently has any Chinese government advanced serious claims to the South China Sea." The truth is that Xisha [Paracel] and Nansha islands have been part of Chinese territory since ancient times. China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands and their adjacent waters. Others in the region did not raise objection to China's sovereignty over the Nansha islands before the 1970s. Even so, for the sake of regional prosperity and development, China advocates appropriate settlement of the present disputes through negotiations between relevant parties.

Young also says that "China opposes democratization in Vietnam and Burma," and is "supporting repressive rule" there and that China "should accord to them . . . independence." These are misinterpretation of China's policy toward Burma and Vietnam. China pursues the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in handling relations with other countries. It respects other countries' right to choose their own way of development. It opposes indiscreet or irresponsible remarks on other countries' domestic issues. We are in favour of dialogue and contacts with the Burmese government instead of imposing sanctions. At the same time, we keep a normal state-to-state relationship with Burma. As its neighbour, China wishes to see Burma progress in maintaining political stability, in improving its economy and in realizing ethnic harmony. As for Vietnam's ongoing reform and opening-up, China gives full support to and shares its experience with Vietnam on a comprehensive, dynamic and in-depth basis.

Young alleges that China "has so much influence, in fact, that [it] has gained naval access to the Indian Ocean through Burmese coastal stations," that its "money is the dominant factor in Cambodia's economy" and that it "wanted Vietnam to expand the port of Vinh to accommodate up to 900 Chinese vessels." These allegations are absolutely groundless. With the recent development of regional economic integration, China has made gratifying achievements in mutually beneficial cooperation with countries in Indochina. Chinese companies are engaged in some infrastructure projects through a bidding process. China is collaborating with Thailand, Burma and Laos in the Mekong River navigation project. It is also doing feasibility research with Burma to open a passage for a combined highway-waterway system. I have participated in and witnessed some of these activities, all normal and mutually beneficial economic cooperation. The aim is to promote trade, personal exchanges and tourism, which will help to narrow the development gap between new and old members of Asean.

China treasures the traditional friendship and good-neighbourliness with countries in Indochina. Our interests there is to maintain regional peace, stability and development. We are not trying to "control" or "penetrate" the area, let alone making it a springboard to the Indian Ocean. Surely analyzing international issues with a Cold War mentality, or confrontationally, is out of date.

A CHINA DEBATE

I welcome the statement by China's former ambassador to Vietnam and Laos, Li Jiazhong [Envoy: China Seeks Peace, The 5th Column, Aug. 22], that "China treasures . . . good-neighbourliness with countries in Indochina," in reply to my own column [China Holds the Indochina Key, June 6]. Yet certain actions by parts of the Chinese ruling establishment may not always comport with this correct policy of "good-neighbourliness." Communist Party to Communist Party ties between China and Vietnam go far beyond the formalities of state-to-state negotiations. China's intelligence and military ties and operations in Southeast Asia also may, from time to time, go beyond the correctness of public state-to-state engagements.

China should keep its party-to-party interactions with Vietnam and Laos and its military and intelligence operations in Southeast Asia within the framework of Li's announced state-to-state objectives. For example, there is no need for China to send high-level leaders of its Communist Party to attend congresses of the Vietnamese Communist Party, or be present in Hanoi during meetings of that party's central committee in order to provide the Vietnamese with "fraternal" advice and guidance on policy and leadership issues. Such actions explicitly and directly influence the internal political dynamics of factional competition within the Vietnamese party.

As for China's claims of "indisputable sovereignty" over the Paracel and Spratly islands, and through them to most of the South China Sea, such claims are not well-founded historically or legally. The definitive White Paper refuting Chinese claims was issued by the Republic of Vietnam in Saigon in 1974, after China's military occupation of the Paracel islands. China should be asked to respond in public to the facts presented in that official White Paper. For example, contrary to Li's assertion, there was a delimitation of the sea boundary between China and Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin prior to the new treaty of 2000, made by the French and Qing governments on June 26, 1887. The new treaty in fact moves the sea boundary to the west, closer to Vietnam. This extension of Chinese rights set off protest against the treaty inside Vietnam, first by Do Viet Son, 78 years old and a member of the Vietnamese Communist Party for 54 years, in February 2001, and later by the public when the facts were leaked into public notice.

Indeed, a formal policy of "good-neighbourliness" towards Southeast Asia should encourage China to drop its claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea in favour of peaceful and negotiated rights of shared economic exploitation. Would China care to live up to Li's words?

STEPHEN B. YOUNG
St. Paul, Minnesota

Li says that "analyzing international issues with a Cold War mentality, or confrontationally, is out of date." Someone should notify Li of the fact that communist regimes like that in Beijing haven't been in vogue for a while either. Moreover, counting Vietnam, North Korea, and Iran among its closest friends speaks volumes about China and the Chinese Communist Party's "mentality."

TERRENCE O'DONNELL
Mashpee, Massachusetts

GIVE THE MAN A BREAK

I refer to Fertile Ground [Aug. 1], on the leadership qualities of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Mahathir Mohamad's chosen successor. Abdullah should be given more credit than you allowed. He has contributed to the United Malays National Organization for many years and made contributions to the development of Malaysia. Speculations on the dynamism of the future administration under Abdullah is baseless. One should be given a chance to show one's capabilities before one is judged.

NORASHFAH YAAKOP YAHAYA AL'HAJ
Shah Alam, Selangor

Vietnam lashed out against the United States yesterday, saying "imperialist" Washington was to blame for the world's ongoing wars. On the first working day since ushering in the Year of the Snake last week, the People's Army Daily newspaper printed a front-page editorial criticising what it described as imperialism's continued affront against socialism.

"As far as we know, the imperialists led by the Americans and other hostile forces have never forsaken their ruthlessness in sabotaging socialism and revolutionary movements in the world," it said.

"The culprits who cause wars are none other than the imperialists led by the Americans. Their sole and ultimate aim is to eliminate socialism and interfering to force other nations to follow the orbit of capitalism led by the United States."

Vietnam's press is tightly controlled by party ideologues, many of whom cut their teeth in what they call the American War, which ended in April 1975 with a communist victory.

Criticising the US is a favoured pastime among Vietnamese media. But the latest outburst comes barely two months after US President Bill Clinton made an historic and conciliatory visit to Vietnam, capping a year of apparently warming relations between the two former foes.

Last summer, Hanoi and Washington signed a landmark bilateral trade agreement, among the most comprehensive ever, that would open the vast US market to Vietnamese exports and prise open Vietnam's closeted economy over the next several years. The treaty is expected to be ratified this spring or summer.

Apparently written by Ngo Dinh Cai, an official of the Military-Political Academy outside Hanoi, the article was to be included among draft documents to be discussed at the forthcoming Ninth Communist Party Congress, which will set the nation's political and economic course for the next five years.

Hanoi affirmed last year that the congress was scheduled for the end of the first quarter. But in a hint that full party consensus on several issues had yet to be reached, a senior official said this month that the delegates would gather "this spring", which technically stretches into June.

Heads tend to roll at party congresses, and chief among the concerns is the question of who will run the country for the next five years.

"There certainly are struggles going on behind the scenes," said one Western diplomat in Hanoi. "This [editorial] shows there seems to be reiteration of a more conservative line."

Such hardline bluster could indicate a pitched internal battle between the conservative faction, represented publicly by Communist Party boss Le Kha Phieu, and more reformist elements within the party, which include current Prime Minister Phan Van Khai.

Both officials have been the subject of recent rumours suggesting they will be ousted.

The editorial said dominant themes in the draft documents being reviewed for the Congress included "national independence attached to socialism" and continuing Vietnam's economic renovation policy known as doi moi, which was instituted in 1986 at the country's Sixth Party Congress.

Text of report by Song Chunfeng, carried by Chinese newspaper Guangxi Ribao on 26 January

Leaders of aquatic products departments in Beihai and Qinzhou cities and Hepu County 19 January received a total of 2.26m yuan on behalf of local fishermen from the Nanhai Fishery and the Fishing Port Supervisory Administration of the Ministry of Agriculture as subsidies for diesel oil costs of fishermen who operate in the Nansha Qundao [Spratly Islands].

The development and utilization of fishery resources in Nansha Qundao are of very important significance to protecting the sovereignty of territorial waters and maritime rights and promoting the development and protection of fishery resources. Judging from the development of ocean fishery, the development of the Nansha Qundao fishing area is an important way to alleviate the pressure of offshore fishery resources and also to assure the stability of ocean fishing in the region following the demarcation of boundaries in Beibuwan by China and Vietnam.

Last year, with the concerted efforts of fishery administrative departments at various levels and the broad masses of fishermen, fishing units in this region overcame all kinds of difficulties and continued to direct fishing boats to operate in the Nansha Qundao. This archipelago [Chinese: qundao] has a total of 121 fishing boats that can operate in Nansha Qundao and last year 82 private fishing boats went to the Nansha Qundao for fishing operation.

In order to protect our country's sovereignty of territorial waters and maritime rights, concerned departments continued preferential policies for fishing operation in the Nansha Qundao and, starting last year, the Ministry of Agriculture further increased economic support to fishing boats that operated in the Nansha Qundao and raised subsidies for diesel oil by a great extent. In 2000, the special subsidies for this region reached 4.2m yuan, including 1.94m yuan for state-owned fishing companies and 2.26m yuan for private fishing boats. The amounts of subsidies issued to private fishing boasts in Beihai City, Qinzhou City and Hepu County were 1.4m yuan, 610,000 yuan and 250,000 yuan respectively. The money will be promptly given to private fishing boats in full, strictly according to regulations.

Iraq  President Saddam Hussein on Saturday called for the Joint Iraq-Vietnamese Cooperation Committee to work for enhanced relations between the two countries, the official Iraqi News Agency (INA) reported.

Saddam made the call during his meeting with visiting Vietnamese Vice Prime Minister Nguyen Cong Tan and his accompanying delegation.

Saddam stressed the depth of friendship between the two countries, INA reported without elaborating.

For his part, the Vietnamese official criticized the almost daily airspace violations by the U.S. and British warplanes over northern and southern Iraq, and urged an early end to the decade- old sanctions.

The United Nations imposed sanctions on Iraq following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The U.S.-led coalition forces launched the six-week Gulf War in early 1991 to drive Iraqi troops out of Kuwait.

Earlier Saturday, the Vietnamese deputy prime minister held talks with Iraqi Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan, who expressed the hope to achieve "strategic cooperation" with Vietnam.

The Vietnamese official, heading a 100-member delegation, arrived here Friday evening in the first flight from Vietnam to Iraq in 10 years.

Vietnam has been calling for the lifting of sanctions against Iraq and has become an important trade partner with the sanctions- hit country under the U.N. oil-for-food program, which allows Iraq to export oil in return for imports of food, medicine and other necessities under U.N. supervision.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has praised Vietnam, telling a visiting delegation that Hanoi is the only government whose alliance with Iraq has not wavered since the 1991 Gulf War.

The Iraqi leader says his country has found out that Vietnam's friendship differs from that of other allies. He's called on the two countries' joint commission to work to expand bilateral relations. A plane from Hanoi carrying aid supplies and a 100-strong delegation arrived in Baghdad on Friday. It was the first time Vietnam had defied the 10-year air embargo against Iraq - imposed by the United Nations.

NEW ADMINISTRATION LIKELY TO ENGAGE ASIAN NEIGHBORS TO INCREASE LEVERAGE
BY MARK MCDONALD
Mercury News Vietnam Bureau

HANOI -- The new U.S. administration of George W. Bush is expected to take a tougher approach toward China. And Vietnam, a nation with a long history of tension with its giant neighbor to the north, could play an important role in any U.S. attempt to reshape its Asian policy.

But the Vietnamese also are signaling their reluctance at being drawn into any new alliances against China.

That diplomatic hesitation may have been behind Hanoi's last-minute cancellation this week of a visit by Adm. Dennis Blair, the commander of all U.S. military forces in Asia and the Pacific. Blair was on a tour of Southeast Asia that has been widely seen as part of exploring a regional alignment that could be part of a U.S. policy to balance or contain Chinese domination of the region.

``I imagine the new administration will pay much more attention to Southeast Asia, whereas the Clinton administration tended to be pretty Sino-centric,'' said Andrew Scobell, research professor at the U.S. Army War College. ``That's why Admiral Blair has been showing the flag, reassuring our allies and reaching out to countries like Vietnam and India.''

The Vietnamese -- while preaching non-alignment -- may yet pursue their own method of balancing Chinese strength by establishing better relations with the United States, India, Japan and their regional neighbors. But Hanoi will be very careful to give the impression it's not actively engaged in any containment efforts.

"It's not in our self-interest to join any alliances with China or against China,'' said Pham Cao Phong, a professor at the Institute for International Relations in Hanoi, a training academy for future diplomats. ``We just want to be good friends and reliable partners.''

In an astonishing diplomatic insult, the Vietnamese canceled Blair's trip just as he was about to fly in from Laos. An embarrassed Foreign Ministry official in Hanoi said Tuesday night that affairs of state had simply left the Vietnamese ``too busy'' to receive Blair. She said the admiral would be invited back soon.

Off beaten path

Although Hanoi is hardly a routine port of call for a U.S. admiral -- there's no port, for one thing -- previous Asia-Pacific commanders have come to the Vietnamese capital carrying serious diplomatic portfolios. Blair's immediate predecessor, for example, Adm. Joseph Prueher, is now U.S. ambassador to China.

Blair, too, will be no accidental tourist when he finally arrives. He will say publicly what he is supposed to say, that the principal interest of the United States continues to be locating the U.S. servicemen who are listed as missing in action in Vietnam.

But the real substance of Blair's agenda will be talking to the Vietnamese about the security of the globally important shipping lanes in the South China Sea, about eventual U.S. help in improving the tin-pot Vietnamese navy, and about U.S. Navy ships perhaps making port calls at Cam Ranh Bay when the Russian lease of that deep-water facility expires in 2004.

In a visit in March, Secretary of Defense William Cohen hinted broadly at U.S. interest in developing security ties with its former foe, in part to balance China's influence in the region. He suggested to Vietnamese generals that they could gain ``considerable leverage in dealing with China'' by aligning with their regional neighbors.

Cohen's visit, followed by President Clinton's three-day drive-by in November, was intended ``to draw Vietnam into the United States' military engagement plan for the Asia-Pacific,'' according to Carlyle Thayer, a leading regional military expert and a professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

Some U.S. policy-makers feel the Clinton administration, however, has not been active enough in pursuing this strategy. ``We need to be more engaged there,'' said Scobell. ``Countries in the region have been concerned that the U.S. has been too aloof.''

Spread of influence

The Chinese, for their part, have been extremely active in Southeast Asia. In the past 16 months, Beijing has negotiated long-term friendship agreements with virtually every country in the region, from Burma to the Philippines, from Thailand to Indonesia to Vietnam. And there's real substance to these Chinese deals: roads, ports, bridges, weapons, money.

Also, everywhere in the region, in every country, Chinese goods continue to flood the markets, from steel ingots and cheap motorbikes to phony cosmetics and pirated DVDs.

Colonization isn't called colonization any more -- it's called branding -- and it's no longer accomplished with armies. It's done with merchandise, with soap and toothpaste and bicycles, with instant noodles and color TVs.

``Old-fashioned power politics are still at play,'' said Scobell, ``but perhaps most importantly now it's also economics.''

The Vietnamese are excellent students of both history and geography, which makes them understandably wary of China. Nobody knows more about a China threat than the Vietnamese. As scholar David Wurfel said, ``Fear and distrust of China must surely be the most important emotional foundation of Vietnamese foreign policy.''

At the same time, the Vietnamese are careful to pay Confucian deference to the ``elder brother'' to the north, an approach that's very much part of the Vietnamese heritage. In the 10th century, for example, when a Vietnamese warrior-king finally booted Chinese troops out of Vietnam, he continued to send tribute payments to Peking for fear of compounding the offense of having actually defeated them in battle.

Forty years ago, Chinese and Vietnamese officials liked to say their countries were ``as close as lips and teeth.'' China helped finance Vietnam's wars against the French and the Americans, and Chinese engineers built massive seaports and steel mills for their poor brethren to the south.

But the lips snarled and the teeth began to bite when Vietnam drifted into the Soviet camp in the 1970s. China and Vietnam fought a border war in 1979, squabbled over land and sea borders, and argued about communist ideology.

They finally established diplomatic relations 10 years ago, although that rapprochement hardly calmed the diplomatic waters.

Their November 1991 treaty had barely been completed when the Vietnamese received yet another en garde from Beijing: In February 1992, China restated its sovereignty over the entire South China Sea, including the much-disputed Spratly Islands, and said it would use force to back up its claims.

The continuing and heated debate over the largely uninhabitable and largely submerged Spratly archipelago is a clear danger to regional stability, although finding a solution has proved as craggy and obdurate as the rocky atoll itself. The six claimants are trying to work out a code of conduct for the area, but with little sign of success.

The Philippines, another Spratlys contender -- along with Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan -- routinely patrols the area and in May seized a Chinese boat that was poaching turtles. The Chinese fishing captain was killed, and Beijing demanded compensation, although the Chinese Foreign Ministry later played down the incident.

Oil and gas reserves in the area, while fabled, are still largely unknown. But even if there's not a single barrel of recoverable oil, the Spratlys remain strategically critical simply because of their location -- smack-dab in the middle of one of the world's busiest sea lanes.

Jockeying for position

It's not surprising, then, that China and Vietnam have rushed to plant territorial markers on every pathetic outcropping of rock that gets exposed at low tide. On the larger reefs and islets, they have installed signal stations, naval dockages or ``fishermen's shacks'' -- poorly disguised military garrisons that must be regularly provisioned.

But for all the maritime activity and political posturing over the Spratlys, a solution there will be years in the making. In the meantime, the issue needn't destabilize relations among Vietnam, China and the other claimants.

Indeed, China and Vietnam have settled their land-border dispute, and high-level political traffic between Hanoi and Beijing has never been busier. Economic and cultural exchanges are flourishing -- the Chinese state circus is coming to Hanoi next week -- and there has been a general de-escalation of tensions all around.

``China is becoming more skilled in the diplomacy game, and you see that being played out all over Southeast Asia,'' said Scobell, of the Army War College.

``Vietnam, meanwhile, is trying to balance China without antagonizing China. They're trying to play the game, too. And they're playing it very gingerly.''

Russia, the United States and China jockey for position with Vietnam as it decides the future of its naval and air base on the South China Sea

IN THE SPRING OF 1979, a Soviet navy fleet sailed into Cam Ranh Bay to establish what became Moscow's largest naval base and staging area outside the Soviet Union. With Moscow's lease since 1978 due to expire in 2004, the future of Cam Ranh Bay is now being debated. And its fate may reflect much more than just what happens to one of the finest deep-water shelters in Southeast Asia.

Hanoi has a crucial decision to make: to keep its best port and the adjoining air base as a military centre or to develop it as a commercial venture for foreign vessels, including even American warships. The choice will be a clear signal of whether communist-run Vietnam will stick to a largely state-dominated economy and a wary foreign policy closely allied to China, or shift to a more open-door economic policy and broader relations with the West.

Cam Ranh Bay first came to international prominence in 1905 when a Tsarist fleet stopped there on a seven-month voyage en route to defeat by Japan at the Battle of Tsushima. That battle ended the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, forcing Russia to abandon its Far East expansionism. Half a century later, the United States transformed Cam Ranh Bay into a major naval and air base for the Vietnam War. At the height of the conflict in 1969, Lyndon Johnson inspected it as the first U.S. president to visit Vietnam. In 1972 the Americans handed it over to their South Vietnamese allies. Three years later North Vietnamese forces captured it.

Conflict between Vietnam and its oldest enemy, China, plus Hanoi's need for big-power protection, allowed the Russians to return in 1978. They built an electronic listening post and based warships, long-range bombers and fighters at Cam Ranh Bay, turning it into Moscow's beachhead in Southeast Asia. The break-up of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s however brought hard times. The Vietnamese have since taken over control of much of the port area as the zone used by the Russians has shrunk. Other than occasional calls by Russian navy vessels, only some 30 Russians maintain the signals intelligence station, periodically tracking ships in the South China Sea.

With renewed expressions of Russian, Chinese and American interest, Vietnamese officials say Cam Ranh Bay has been the subject of lengthy discussion in recent months. The lease is high on the agenda for Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Vietnam early in 2001, probably in March. The U.S. has shown interest in a ship visit and is expected to renew that proposal when Adm. Dennis Blair, commander-in-chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific, visits Vietnam in early January.

A SUITCASE WITH A BROKEN HANDLE

Analysts say that Putin is keen to retain Russia's hold on the bay despite his country's economic problems. Alexander Belkin, a senior executive at the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, a think-tank in Moscow, likens Russia's relationship with Cam Ranh Bay to travelling with a suitcase with a broken handle: "It's hard to carry but difficult to abandon."

Belkin, a former Soviet armed forces officer, foresees some future military value for the base but says maintenance costs are high. The intelligence station could be used for training but any information it gathers wouldn't be of much use, he says, because it will be years before the Russian navy returns in force to the region.

Putin however is eager to please the military, so he wants to keep Cam Ranh Bay. Vietnamese officials say that Moscow's desire to hang on to the base helps account for its willingness to resolve its debt dispute with Vietnam in September. The problem had bedevilled ties for almost a decade. As part of the agreement, a senior Vietnamese official says, Moscow wrote off up to 85% of the debt. Russia had initially claimed $11 billion based on Soviet-era valuations.

But continued Russian control of the base faces some opposition in Vietnam. A senior Vietnamese Foreign Ministry official says Moscow pays virtually nothing to use the port for merchant-ship repairs and that the large, deep and strategically situated harbour is an important asset that Vietnam as a poor country cannot afford to let sit idle. Yet it's unlikely that anyone else will be allowed to operate in Cam Ranh Bay before 2004, the official says. Vietnam's conservative old-guard leaders are particularly sentimental about past Russian support and don't want to offend its principal arms supplier.

The official notes that the Chinese have inquired about the state of Cam Ranh Bay and expressed interest in developing it. Carlyle Thayer of Honolulu's Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies says that some companies owned by the People's Liberation Army may like to get involved but don't have much chance of success.

Still, in a surprising development that reflects the extent of normalization between Beijing and Hanoi, a Chinese naval delegation paid a friendship visit to Vietnam's Military Regions Five and Seven in November. It was the first such Chinese trip to the particularly sensitive Region Seven, which includes Cam Ranh Bay and the disputed Spratly Islands. Neither were apparently on the Chinese itinerary.

CAUTIOUS HANOI

To the interest of analysts, Vietnam's media reported the visit but no mention of it was made in China's state-controlled press. A Vietnamese official says that Hanoi may first ask Chinese ships to visit Cam Ranh Bay before extending an invitation to Washington. That intention, a former U.S. official says, may help explain China's public silence about the November mission--Beijing doesn't want to go ahead with its own ship visit to Cam Ranh Bay if it believes that Hanoi only wants it to pave the way for a U.S. port call. Having allowed the Chinese navy in, Vietnam could argue that it was only being even-handed. But "the Chinese are too smart to be played by the Vietnamese," says Kurt Campbell, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defence who has dealt with Vietnam since 1995.

On possible U.S. involvement in Cam Ranh Bay, U.S. ambassador to Vietnam Pete Peterson says flatly: "We have no aspirations to use that facility." He adds it is more likely that Vietnam will use it for business rather than military purposes. In Honolulu, a senior official at the headquarters of the U.S. Pacific Command says: "We are not pressing for a ship visit. There is no urgency."

But other knowledgeable Americans confirm that there is U.S. interest in their ships calling at the port. Senator John Kerry, a Vietnam War veteran and key player in improving U.S. relations with Vietnam, says: "Having access to Cam Ranh Bay is not critical but it's a convenience for us to be able to drop anchor on the way from Japan to the Middle East rather than go to Guam."He adds that the Vietnamese envisage opening Cam Ranh Bay to cruise ships, but access for U.S. navy vessels will be difficult in view of Hanoi's deep suspicion of American intentions. One example of such distrust: U.S. teams working to recover the remains of American servicemen in Vietnam are barred from using U.S. military communications. They have to rent satellite telephones from Hanoi.

The caution of Vietnam's top leaders isn't matched by some impatient younger officials, who see valuable real estate being wasted. Some planners believe it is foolish to leave the port and runway virtually unused while the country needs to boost tourism and exports. A Western diplomat says a senior official of Khanh Hoa province, which includes Cam Ranh Bay, complained to him that while the base airstrip was empty, large numbers of tourists couldn't reach the fabled white-sand beaches of nearby Nha Trang because the provincial airport can only handle small planes.

Kerry says the U.S. and Vietnam have quietly discussed the possibility of a U.S. port call but "the issue is China"--referring to Hanoi's anxiety about annoying Beijing. China invaded Vietnam in 1979 to teach it a lesson for its 1978 invasion of Cambodia. In addition, the conservative leaders of Hanoi want to avoid any entanglement with the United States. But at the same time they want the U.S. to be active in the region as a stabilizing power. Campbell, the former defence official, says that in quiet meetings in Hanoi, Vietnamese officials often impress on him how important it is that the U.S. stays engaged in the region.

A senior Vietnamese official says he is frustrated that Vietnam doesn't benefit more from Cam Ranh Bay because of fears about China's reaction. "The more afraid you are of the ghost, the less often you will go out of your home," he says. Some years ago the Americans told the Vietnamese that they were interested in developing Cam Ranh Bay as an economic zone. American companies made some cost estimates but the idea failed to take off, according to U.S. officials.

"What they primarily want is economic engagement and remodelling of the facility," says Campbell, adding that the Vietnamese believe one way to achieve this would be through a relationship with the deep-pocketed U.S. military. "At the same time they very much do not want to trigger the anxiety of our friends in Beijing," he notes. So Hanoi makes it clear that Cam Ranh Bay should be open not only to U.S. ships but also to visits by vessels from other countries, including China. "But China has been, at least to date, very careful about the subtle offer by our friends," Campbell adds.

In terms of public diplomacy, Campbell says, "the Vietnamese are absolutely clear that they want no part of big-power rivalry and they don't want to be seen as an American outpost. China has also made clear to Vietnam privately that it has to handle its relationship with the U.S. carefully."

Campbell points to a political shift in Vietnam that explains a slowing of relations with the U.S. since the two countries resumed diplomatic ties in 1995. "What you see is the coming to power of very conservative officials who are both careful about the path and pace of economic reform and cautious about engagement with the U.S. for a variety of reasons," he says.

President Bill Clinton met some of those officials in November on his visit to Vietnam which, according to Communist Party officials, ran smack into a long-standing rift within the party over the pace of reform and relations with China and the United States. According to a U.S. official familiar with Clinton's talks with Party Secretary-General Le Kha Phieu, the president said the U.S. sought Vietnam's friendship for its own sake and not to form an alliance against China. The Americans hoped this direct statement might help allay suspicions.

Whether or not Hanoi was reassured, the Communist Party of Vietnam is to decide on broad policy guidelines for the next five years at a pivotal congress scheduled for March. Its outcome may determine what next happens in the now quiet waters of Cam Ranh Bay.

China, Vietnam to Settle Tonkin Border Dispute
December 25, 2000 12:57 am EST

HANOI (Reuters) - The presidents of China and Vietnam are expected to sign agreements in Beijing Monday settling a long-standing border dispute in the Tonkin Gulf, state media reported.

Foreign ministry officials from both countries have already initialed the two-part settlement in preparation for a signing ceremony between Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong, Xinhua news agency reported.

Luong is scheduled to arrive in China Monday for a five-day visit.

The Tonkin Gulf agreements included a demarcation of the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zones of the two sides, and an agreement on fishing activities, Xinhua said.

The agreements would cap years of negotiations over the body of water, known in China as Beibu Bay, and followed an historic land border agreement between the two sides last year.

That agreement covered 1,200 km (750 miles) of shared border, including 70 areas that had been in dispute since the sides fought a brief but intense war in 1979.

During the war, Chinese troops poured southwards into Vietnam to punish Hanoi for toppling the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, which at the time was a China ally. The conflict inflicted heavy casualties on both sides.

Beijing and Hanoi normalized diplomatic relations in 1991.

The Vietnam's Communist Party mouthpiece Nhan Dan (People) newspaper said the signing would contribute to "creating impetus for strengthening mutual trust, cooperation and friendship" between the two countries.

"We are glad to recognize that the cooperative and friendly relations between Vietnam and China, especially since the normalization of relations, has continuously been consolidated and developed," Nhan Dan said in Monday's front page editorial.

Hanoi and Beijing still have competing claims in two South China Sea archipelagoes -- the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands. The islands are also claimed wholly or partly by the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan.

China, Vietnam Finally Resolve Disputed Tonkin Gulf Border

BEIJING, Dec 25 (AFP) - The Chinese and Vietnamese foreign ministers Monday finally signed a joint statement to demarcate their disputed Gulf of Tonkin sea border after years of bitter argument. Foreign Ministers Tang Jiaxuan of China and Nguyen Dy Nien of Vietnam signed the statements on the first day of President Tran Duc Luong's five-day official visit here.

The hotly-contested Gulf of Tonkin border between southern China and northern Vietnam was finally settled, as well as an agreement on fishery cooperation in the gulf, which China calls Beibu Gulf, Chinese Xinhua state news agency said.

Negotiations between the communist rivals on the demarcation of territorial waters in the gulf have dragged on since 1992.

The two countries also pledged to expand relations and avoid the use of force in settling disputes, following Luong's talks with "They will consult each other in time in case of disputes and adopt a cool and constructive attitude to handle them properly. They will not allow disputes to impede the normal development of their relations." The statement said the two countries would undertake to "implement in real earnest" accords already signed on their common land border.

Vietnam and China officially agreed on that border a year ago, two decades after a short but bloody conflict between the two neighbours following Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, then allied to Beijing.

The neighbours also agreed to carry out "multi-level military exchanges" and expand cooperation in the security field.

In addition, they listed several other areas including economics, education, culture and international bodies in which the two sides would foster exchanges.

The statement said Vietnam would uphold the "one-China" policy and conduct only unofficial economic exchanges and trade with Taiwan.

"China understands and appreciates the above position" the joint statement said, noting "China is firmly opposed to the establishment of any official relations in any form or any exchanges of an official nature with Taiwan by countries having diplomatic relations with China." However there was no progress made on the two sides' bitter dispute regarding sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratlys island chains to the far south of China. Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines also lay claim to the Spratlys.

Luong's visit is his first to China as head of state and the second visit by a Vietnamese president since the two nations normalized relations in 1991, Xinhua said. Luong held talks with Chinese President Jiang Zemin on Monday, it added.

Besides Beijing, Luong will also tour Shanghai and Xiamen, Xinhua said.

China, Hosting Vietnam President, Restates Claim to Disputed Islands

BEIJING, Dec 26 (AFP) - China on Tuesday hailed an ongoing visit by Vietnam's president a "success," while also declaring itself the undisputed master of islands claimed by both countries. On Monday, the first day of a five-day visit by Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong, the two countries signed a series of agreements while steering clear of the issue of the disputed Spratley and Paracel islands in the South China Sea.

"China's position on the South China Sea is very clear, that China has indisputable sovereignty over the Spratley Islands and surrounding waters," foreign ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said Tuesday at the ministry's regular press briefing.

Not only China and Vietnam, but also Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines lay claim to the Spratleys. China seized the Paracels from Vietnam and now considers them part of the nearby island province of Hainan.

President Luong held talks with his Chinese counterpart on Monday, and on Tuesday went on to meet with Premier Zhu Rongji and Li Peng, chairman of China's national parliament, the Xinhua news agency said.

The Chinese and Vietnamese foreign ministers on Monday signed a joint statement to demarcate their disputed Gulf of Tonkin sea border after years of bitter argument, and reached an agreement on fishery cooperation in the gulf.

"This shows that the two sides will approach their bilateral relations from a strategic perspective," foreign ministry spokeswoman Zhang said.

During the first day of Luong's visit, the two sides also signed pacts on the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy and cooperation between their national news agencies.

But the Spratley and Paracel islands, potentially the most divisive issues between the two countries, were not on the agenda, the Chinese foreign ministry said.

"As far as I understand, the two sides have not touched upon the question of the South China Sea," Zhang said.

Chinese and Vietnamese forces clashed in the South China Sea in 1988 and 1992, and on both occasions the Chinese emerged victorious.

Both countries have fielded historical and archeological evidence to support their claims in the disputed waters, and China has produced historical records showing it sent naval expeditions to the Spratleys as early as in 110 A.D.

Luong's visit, his first to China as head of state and the second visit by a Vietnamese president since the two nations normalized relations in 1991, will also take him to the cities of Shanghai and Xiamen.

China, Vietnam Sidestep Thorny Spratly Dispute

BEIJING, Dec 26, 2000 -- (Reuters) China and Vietnam have sidestepped thorny disputes over South China Sea islands during a visit by Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong hailed as a success by both sides, a government spokeswoman said on Tuesday.

On Monday Luong and Chinese President Jiang Zemin signed agreements settling a long-standing border dispute in the Tonkin Gulf, known in China as Beibu Bay.

Both sides praised the accords as new evidence of warmth between the countries which fought a brief but bloody border war in 1979.

But foreign ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue said the two sides did not discuss the Spratly and Paracel islands, more complex and potentially explosive problems.

"As far as I understand, the two sides did not touch on the question of the South China Sea islands," Zhang told reporters at a briefing.

Hanoi and Beijing both lay claim to the potentially oil-rich archipelagos, also contested wholly or in part by the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Taiwan.

However, in an apparent reference to the islands, a joint statement issued on Monday said the two sides "agree to maintain the existing negotiation mechanism on the marine issue".

Beijing and Hanoi would "persist in seeking a fundamental and everlasting solution acceptable to both sides through peaceful negotiations," the statement said.

China and Vietnam also signed cooperative agreements on education, trade, science and technology and nuclear energy.

"Not only will the agreements ensure the long-term stability of Beibu Bay, but also ensure China and Vietnam develop long-term stable relations," Zhang said.

"MANY RESULTS"

Zhang praised Luong's visit for producing "many results".

Luong was quoted by China's official Xinhua news agency as saying the accords "formed a solid foundation for the all-round development of bilateral relations".

"The two countries have celebrated the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties and bilateral relations are now in a sound stage of development," Luong was quoted as saying.

The Tonkin Gulf agreements cap years of negotiations and include the demarcation of territorial waters and the exclusive economic zones of the two sides, and an agreement on fishing. They follow a historic land-border agreement between the two sides last year.

That agreement covered 1,200 kilometers (750 miles) of shared border, including 70 areas that had been in dispute since the 1979 war.

During the war, Chinese troops poured south into Vietnam to punish Hanoi for toppling the Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia, at the time was a China ally. The conflict inflicted heavy casualties on both sides.

Luong, on a five-day trip to China, is scheduled to leave Beijing on Wednesday to visit the coastal boomtowns of Shanghai and Xiamen.

Vietnam reaffirms claim on disputed Spratly and Paracel islands
ABC news 28-12-2000

Vietnam has reaffirmed its sovereignty over the disputed Spratly and Paracel islands in the South China sea.

The move comes just a day after China, another claimant to the islands, declared itself the undisputed master.

On Monday, the first day of a five-day visit to China by Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong, the two countries signed a series of agreements but stayed clear of the disputed islands.

Vietnam and China have clashed twice over the Spratly Islands, in 1988 and 1992. The Spratlys is believed to sit atop vast reserves of oil and gas.

China seized the Paracels from Vietnam and now considers them part of the nearby island province of Hainan.

Both islands, seen as potential flashpoints in the region, are also claimed by Taiwan, Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines.

HANOI, Dec 26, 2000 -- (Reuters) Vietnam and India are expected to discuss common security concerns, particularly China, during a visit to Hanoi next month by Indian Premier Atal Behari Vajpayee, diplomats said on Tuesday.

Vietnam's Foreign Ministry said on Monday Vajpayee would visit in early January. It gave no further details, but the Indian newspaper The Hindu, said last week Vajpayee would make a three-day trip from January 7 then head on to Indonesia.

The visit to communist Vietnam would be the first by an Indian prime minister since 1994 and follows one to India in December 1999 by Vietnam's President Tran Duc Luong.

Diplomats said India is eager to enhance its dialogue with the 10-member Association of South East Asian Nations, which Vietnam currently chairs. India is a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum, a broader 37-nation security grouping.

COMMON VIEW ON CHINA

"Also they share a common perspective on China," one diplomat said.

An Indian diplomat said his country was pleased to see improved relations between Vietnam and China in recent years.

"We started mending our relations with China and so is Vietnam. We are extremely happy about that."

On Monday, the presidents of Vietnam and China signed agreements in Beijing settling a long-standing border dispute in the Tonkin Gulf. Last year, the two countries signed a historic land border agreement covering areas that had been in dispute since they fought a brief but intense war in 1979.

Vajpayee's visit to Vietnam will follow one to Hanoi in November by Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh. Singh offered Vietnam assistance in information technology, biotechnology, human resources development and trade.

During Vajpayee's visit, the two countries are expected to discuss further how India can help Vietnam realize its ambition to emulate India as a global player in information technology.

Although India and Vietnam have had warm ties for many years, not least because of a mutual wariness of China, bilateral trade remains limited. The Indian diplomat estimated it at about $160 million in the past year.

"This is not very great and trade is highly in favor of India. It's highly imbalanced and we feel we should try to increase imports Vietnamese manufactured commodities," he said.

India currently has foreign direct investment projects worth about $135 million in Vietnam, including interests in the sugar, plastics and electronics industries.

This amount will increase significantly after the signing of key parts of a $1.5 billion deal earlier this month under which a foreign consortium including India's ONGC Videsh will extract natural gas from Vietnam's Nam Con Son basin.