Tôn Tẩn Binh Pháp
The Art of War
by
SunTzu
The Art of War: Book I
1.
Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.
2.
It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin.
Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.
3.
The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken
into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions
obtaining in the field.
4.
These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander;
(5) Method and discipline.
5, 6.
The MORAL LAW causes the people to be in complete accord with their
ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by
any danger.
7.
HEAVEN signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.
8.
EARTH comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open
ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.
9.
The COMMANDER stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerely, benevolence,
courage and strictness.
10.
By METHOD AND DISCIPLINE are to be understood the marshaling of the
army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers,
the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control
of military expenditure.
11.
These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them
will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.
12.
Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the
military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:
--
13.
(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?
(2)
Which of the two generals has most ability?
(3)
With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?
(4) On
which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
(5)
Which army is stronger?
(6) On
which side are officers and men more highly trained?
(7) In
which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
14.
By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or
defeat.
15.
The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer:
--let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my
counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat: --let such a one be dismissed!
16.
While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any
helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.
17.
According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's
plans.
18.
All warfare is based on deception.
19.
Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces,
we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are
far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.
20.
Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.
21.
If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in
superior strength, evade him.
22.
If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend
to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.
23.
If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united,
separate them.
24.
Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.
25.
These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged
beforehand.
26.
Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple
ere the battle is fought.
The general who loses a battle
makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to
victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all!
It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or
lose.
The Art of War: Book II
1.
Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a
thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand
mail-clad soldiers,with provisions enough to carry them a thousand LI, [2.78
modern LI go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly since Sun Tzu's
time.] the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of
guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and
armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is
the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.
2.
When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then
men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege
to a town, you will exhaust your strength.
3.
Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will
not be equal to the strain.
4.
Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength
exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take
advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert
the consequences that must ensue.
5.
Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never
been seen associated with long delays.
6.
There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged
warfare.
7.
It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that
can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.
8.
The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his
supply-wagons loaded more than twice.
9.
Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus
the army will have food enough for its needs.
10.
Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by
contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance
causes the people to be impoverished.
11.
On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and
high prices cause the people's substance to be drained away.
12.
When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted
by heavy exactions.
13, 14.
With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of
the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be
dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses,
breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective
mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its
total revenue.
15.
Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One
cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and
likewise a single PICUL of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's
own store.
16.
Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that
there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
17.
Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been
taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be
substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in
conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and
kept.
18.
This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own strength.
19.
In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.
20.
Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the
people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace
or in peril.
1.
Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to
take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so
good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to
capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.
2.
Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme
excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance
without fighting.
3.
Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the
next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order
is to attack the enemy's army in the field;
4.
The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be
avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements
of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over
against the walls will take three months more.
5.
The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to
the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are
slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects
of a siege.
6.
Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any
fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows
their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.
7.
With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and
thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete. This is the method
of attacking by stratagem.
8.
It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to
surround him; if five to one, to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide
our army into two.
9.
If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in
numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee
from him.
10.
Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small force, in the
end it must be captured by the larger force.
11.
Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the bulwark is complete
at all points; the State will be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the
State will be weak.
12.
There are three ways in which a ruler can bring misfortune upon his
army:--
13.
(1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, being ignorant of
the fact that it cannot obey. This is called hobbling the army.
14.
(2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as he administers a
kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes
restlessness in the soldier's minds.
15.
(3) By employing the officers of his army without discrimination,
through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to circumstances.
This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.
16.
But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble is sure to come
from the other feudal princes. This is simply bringing anarchy into the army,
and flinging victory away.
17.
Thus we may know that there are five essentials for victory:
(1) He
will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight.
(2) He
will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.
(3) He
will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks.
(4) He
will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.
(5) He
will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the
sovereign.
18. Hence the saying: If you know
the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred
battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you
will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you
will succumb in every battle.
1.
Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the
possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the
enemy.
2.
To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the
opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.
3.
Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but
cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.
4.
Hence the saying: One may KNOW how to conquer without being able to DO
it.
5.
Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat
the enemy means taking the offensive.
6.
Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a
superabundance of strength.
7.
The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses
of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost
heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves;
on the other, a victory that is complete.
8.
To see victory only when it is within the ken of the common herd is not
the acme of excellence.
9.
Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the
whole Empire says, "Well done!"
10.
To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see the sun and
moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a
quick ear.
11.
What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but
excels in winning with ease.
12.
Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit
for courage.
13.
He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making no mistakes is what
establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is
already defeated.
14.
Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position which makes
defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.
15.
Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle
after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first
fights and afterwards looks for victory.
16.
The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to
method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.
17.
In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly,
Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances;
fifthly, Victory.
18.
Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to
Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to
Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.
19.
A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound's weight
placed in the scale against a single grain.
20.
The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters
into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.
1.
Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the
control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.
2.
Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from
fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and
signals.
3.
To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's
attack and remain unshaken - this is effected by maneuvers direct and
indirect.
4.
That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an
egg - this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.
5.
In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but
indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.
6.
Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible as Heaven and
Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they
end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once
more.
7.
There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of
these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.
8.
There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white,
and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen.
9.
There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, acrid, salt, sweet,
bitter), yet combinations of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.
10.
In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack - the direct
and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series
of maneuvers.
11.
The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like
moving in a circle - you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the
possibilities of their combination?
12.
The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll
stones along in its course.
13.
The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which
enables it to strike and destroy its victim.
14.
Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in
his decision.
15.
Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the
releasing of a trigger.
16.
Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder
and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be
without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
17.
Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, simulated fear
postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.
18.
Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of
subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of
latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical
dispositions.
19.
Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains
deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act. He sacrifices
something, that the enemy may snatch at it.
20.
By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of
picked men he lies in wait for him.
21.
The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does
not require too much from individuals. Hence his ability to pick out the right
men and utilize combined energy.
22.
When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men become as it were
like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to
remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if
four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling
down.
23.
Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a
round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the
subject of energy.
1.
Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of
the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has
to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted.
2.
Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does
not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.
3.
By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of
his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the
enemy to draw near.
4.
If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied
with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force him to
move.
5.
Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly
to places where you are not expected.
6.
An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches
through country where the enemy is not. , strike at vulnerable points, shun
places that are defended, attack in unexpected quarters."
7.
You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places
which are undefended. You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only
hold positions that cannot be attacked. , making it impossible for the enemy
to guard against him. This being so, the places that I shall attack are
precisely those that the enemy cannot defend.... He who is skilled in defense
hides in the most secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the
enemy to estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I shall hold
are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack."
8.
Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know
what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know
what to attack.
9.
O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be
invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in
our hands.
10.
You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the
enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements
are more rapid than those of the enemy.
11.
If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even
though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do
is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.
12.
If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us
even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground.
All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way.
13.
By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible
ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's must be
divided.
14.
We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into
fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a
whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few.
15.
And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior
one, our opponents will be in dire straits.
16.
The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the
enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different
points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers
we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.
17.
For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear;
should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen
his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will
weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be
weak.
18.
Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible
attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these
preparations against us.
19.
Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate
from the greatest distances in order to fight.
20.
But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be
impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left,
the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much
more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI
apart, and even the nearest are separated by several LI!
21.
Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in
number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then
that victory can be achieved.
22.
Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from
fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their
success.
23.
Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. Force
him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.
24.
Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know
where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.
25.
In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to
conceal them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying
of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.
26.
How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own
tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.
27.
All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is
the strategy out of which victory is evolved.
28.
Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let
your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.
29.
Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course
runs away from high places and hastens downwards.
30.
So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is
weak.
31.
Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over
which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom
he is facing.
32.
Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there
are no constant conditions.
33.
He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby
succeed in winning, may be called a heaven- born captain.
34.
The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always
equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. There
are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.
1.
Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the
sovereign.
2.
Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and
harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp.
3.
After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing
more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the
devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.
4.
Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out
of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal
before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.
5.
Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined
multitude, most dangerous.
6.
If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an
advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to
detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage
and stores.
7.
Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make
forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual
distance at a stretch, doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the
leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.
8.
The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and
on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.
9.
If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose
the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the
goal.
10.
If you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds of your army
will arrive.
11.
We may take it then that an army without its baggage- train is lost;
without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.
12.
We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs
of our neighbors.
13.
We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with
the face of the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and
precipices, its marshes and swamps.
14.
We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make
use of local guides.
15.
In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.
16.
Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by
circumstances.
17.
Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of the
forest.
18.
In raiding and plundering be like fire, is immovability like a
mountain.
19.
Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move,
fall like a thunderbolt.
20.
When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your
men; when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit
of the soldiery.
21.
Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
22.
He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation.
23.
The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the spoken
word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor
can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners
and flags.
24.
Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes
of the host may be focused on one particular point.
25.
The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for
the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the
art of handling large masses of men.
26.
In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and
in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears
and eyes of your army.
27.
A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander-in-chief may be
robbed of his presence of mind.
28.
Now a solider's spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has
begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp.
29.
A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen,
but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of
studying moods.
30.
Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub
amongst the enemy:--this is the art of retaining self-possession.
31.
To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at
ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy
is famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength.
32.
To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect
order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident
array:--this is the art of studying circumstances.
33.
It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to
oppose him when he comes downhill.
34.
Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers
whose temper is keen.
35.
Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army
that is returning home.
36.
When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a
desperate foe too hard.
37.
Such is the art of warfare.
1.
Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the
sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces.
2.
When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads
intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated
positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate
position, you must fight.
3.
There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be not
attacked, towns which must be besieged, positions which must not be contested,
commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.
4.
The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany
variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.
5.
The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with
the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his
knowledge to practical account.
6.
So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying his
plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to
make the best use of his men.
7.
Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of advantage and of
disadvantage will be blended together.
8.
If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed
in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.
9.
If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready
to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune.
10.
Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them; and make
trouble for them, and keep them constantly engaged; hold out specious
allurements, and make them rush to any given point.
11.
The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's
not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his
not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position
unassailable.
12.
There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general:
(1)
Recklessness, which leads to destruction;
(2)
cowardice, which leads to capture;
(3) a
hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
(4) a
delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
(5)
over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.
13.
These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct
of war.
14.
When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely
be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of
meditation.
1.
Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and
observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the
neighborhood of valleys.
2.
Camp in high places, facing the sun. Do not climb heights in order to
fight. So much for mountain warfare.
3.
After crossing a river, you should get far away from it.
4.
When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not
advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get
across, and then deliver your attack.
5.
If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near
a river which he has to cross.
6.
Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun. Do not
move up-stream to meet the enemy. So much for river warfare.
7.
In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them
quickly, without any delay.
8.
If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass
near you, and get your back to a clump of trees. So much for operations in
salt-marches.
9.
In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position with
rising ground to your right and on your rear, so that the danger may be in
front, and safety lie behind. So much for campaigning in flat country.
10.
These are the four useful branches of military knowledge (1) mountains,
(2) rivers, (3) marshes, and (4) plains. which enabled the Yellow Emperor to
vanquish four several sovereigns.
11.
All armies prefer high ground to low. and sunny places to dark.
12.
If you are careful of your men, and camp on hard ground, the army will
be free from disease of every kind, and this will spell victory.
13.
When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny side, with the
slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your
soldiers and utilize the natural advantages of the ground.
14.
When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river which you wish
to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must wait until it subsides.
15.
Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with torrents running
between, deep natural hollows, confined places, tangled thickets, quagmires
and crevasses, should be left with all possible speed and not approached.
16.
While we keep away from such places, we should get the enemy to
approach them; while we face them, we should let the enemy have them on his
rear.
17.
If in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any hilly country,
ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods
with thick undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched; for
these are places where men in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be
lurking.
18.
When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he is relying on the
natural strength of his position.
19.
When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he is anxious for
the other side to advance.
20.
If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is tendering a bait.
21.
Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the enemy is
advancing. The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass
means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious.
22.
The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an ambuscade. When
it branches out in different directions, it shows that parties have been sent
to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the
army is encamping.
24.
Humble words and increased preparations are signs that the enemy is
about to advance. Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are
signs that he will retreat.
25.
When the light chariots come out first and take up a position on the
wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for battle.
26.
Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant indicate a plot.
27.
When there is much running about and the soldiers fall into rank, it
means that the critical moment has come.
28.
When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is a lure.
29.
When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they are faint from
want of food.
30.
If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking themselves, the
army is suffering from thirst.
31.
If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes no effort to
secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.
32.
If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied. Clamor by night betokens
nervousness.
33.
If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's authority is weak.
If the banners and flags are shifted about, sedition is afoot. If the officers
are angry, it means that the men are weary.
34.
When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its cattle for food,
and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp- fires, showing
that they will not return to their tents, you may know that they are
determined to fight to the death.
35.
The sight of men whispering together in small knots or speaking in
subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank and file.
36.
Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his
resources; too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.
37.
To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy's
numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.
38.
When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign
that the enemy wishes for a truce.
39.
If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a
long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the
situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.
40.
If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply
sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made. What we can do is
simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a close watch on the
enemy, and obtain reinforcements.
41.
He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is
sure to be captured by them.
42.
If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they
will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, then will be practically
useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are
not enforced, they will still be unless.
43.
Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity,
but kept under control by means of iron discipline. This is a certain road to
victory.
44.
If in training soldiers commands are habitually enforced, the army will
be well-disciplined; if not, its discipline will be bad.
45.
If a general shows confidence in his men but always insists on his
orders being obeyed, the gain will be mutual.
1.
Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1)
Accessible ground; plentifully provided with roads and means of
communications. (2) entangling ground; Net-like country, venturing into which
you become entangled. (3) temporizing ground; Ground which allows you to stave
off or delay. (4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a
great distance from the enemy.
2.
Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called
ACCESSIBLE.
3.
With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying
the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies. Then
you will be able to fight with advantage.
4.
Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called
ENTANGLING.
5.
From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally
forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you
fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue.
6.
When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the
first move, it is called TEMPORIZING ground.
7.
In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an
attractive bait, it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to
retreat, thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has
come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.
8.
With regard to NARROW PASSES, if you can occupy them first, let them be
strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.
9.
Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him
if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned.
10.
With regard to PRECIPITOUS HEIGHTS, if you are beforehand with your
adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for
him to come up.
11.
If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but
retreat and try to entice him away.
12.
If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the
strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to provoke a battle, and
fighting will be to your disadvantage.
13.
These six are the principles connected with Earth. The general who has
attained a responsible post must be careful to study them.
14.
Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from
natural causes, but from faults for which the general is responsible. These
are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5)
disorganization; (6) rout.
15.
Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another
ten times its size, the result will be the FLIGHT of the former.
16.
When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak,
the result is INSUBORDINATION. When the officers are too strong and the common
soldiers too weak, the result is COLLAPSE.
17.
When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting
the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment,
before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to
fight, the result is RUIN.
18.
When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not
clear and distinct; when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and
men, and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is
utter DISORGANIZATION.
19.
When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's strength, allows an
inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a
powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the
result must be ROUT.
20.
These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be carefully noted by
the general who has attained a responsible post.
21.
The natural formation of the country is the soldier's best ally; but a
power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the forces of victory, and
of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances, constitutes the
test of a great general.
22.
He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into
practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practices them,
will surely be defeated.
23.
If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even
though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you
must not fight even at the ruler's bidding.
24.
The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without
fearing disgrace, whose only thought is to protect his country and do good
service for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.
25.
Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into
the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own beloved sons, and they will
stand by you even unto death.
26.
If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt;
kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of
quelling disorder: then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they
are useless for any practical purpose.
27.
If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are
unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway
towards victory.
28.
If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our
own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards
victory.
29.
If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men
are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground
makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory.
30.
Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered;
once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.
31.
Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory
will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your
victory complete.
1.
Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground: (1)
Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground;
(5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground;
(8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.
2.
When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive
ground.
3.
When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great
distance, it is facile ground.
4.
Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side,
is contentious ground.
5.
Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.
6.
Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states, so that he who
occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command, is a ground of
intersecting highways.
7.
When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country,
leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground.
8.
Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens--all country that is
hard to traverse: this is difficult ground.
9. Ground which is reached
through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so
that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our
men: this is hemmed in ground.
10.
Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting
without delay, is desperate ground.
11. On dispersive ground,
therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground,
attack not.
12. On open ground, do not try to
block the enemy's way. On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with
your allies.
13. On serious ground, gather in
plunder. In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.
14. On hemmed-in ground, resort
to stratagem. On desperate ground, fight.
15. Those who were called
skillful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy's front
and rear; to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to
hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their
men.
16. When the enemy's men were
united, they managed to keep them in disorder.
17. When it was to their
advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still.
18. If asked how to cope with a
great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the
attack, I should say: "Begin by seizing something which your opponent
holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will."
19. Rapidity is the essence of
war: take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected
routes, and attack unguarded spots.
20. The following are the
principles to be observed by an invading force: The further you penetrate into
a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the
defenders will not prevail against you.
21. Make forays in fertile
country in order to supply your army with food.
22. Carefully study the
well-being of your men, and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and
hoard your strength. Keep your army continually on the move,
[In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It
has struck me, however, that the true reading might be "link your army
together."]
and devise unfathomable plans.
23. Throw your soldiers into
positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. If
they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve.
[Chang Yu quotes his favorite Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 3): "If one
man were to run amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else
tried to get our of his way, I should not allow that this man alone had
courage and that all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a
desperado and a man who sets some value on his life do not meet on even
terms."]
Officers and men alike will put
forth their uttermost strength.
[Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together,
they will surely exert their united strength to get out of it."]
24. Soldiers when in desperate
straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will
stand firm. If they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front.
If there is no help for it, they will fight hard.
25. Thus, without waiting to be
marshaled, the soldiers will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to
be asked, they will do your will;
[Literally, "without asking, you will get."]
without restrictions, they will
be faithful; without giving orders, they can be trusted.
26. Prohibit the taking of omens,
and do away with superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no
calamity need be feared.
[The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears,"
degenerate into cowards and "die many times before their deaths." Tu
Mu quotes Huang Shih-kung: "'Spells and incantations should be strictly
forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by divination into the fortunes
of an army, for fear the soldiers' minds should be seriously perturbed.' The
meaning is," he continues, "that if all doubts and scruples are
discarded, your men will never falter in their resolution until they
die."]
27. If our soldiers are not
overburdened with money, it is not because they have a distaste for riches; if
their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined to
longevity.
[Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and long
life are things for which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they
burn or fling away valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not that
they dislike them, but simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzu is slyly
insinuating that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the general to see that
temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not thrown in their way.]
28. On the day they are ordered
out to battle, your soldiers may weep,
[The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to
indicate more genuine grief than tears alone.]
those sitting up bedewing their
garments, and those lying down letting the tears run down their cheeks.
[Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts`ao Kung says,
"all have embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We may
remember that the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike in showing their
emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful parting at the I River between Ching
K`o and his friends, when the former was sent to attempt the life of the King
of Ch`in (afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all flowed down
like rain as he bade them farewell and uttered the following lines: "The
shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the burn; Your champion is going--Not to
return." ]
But let them once be brought to
bay, and they will display the courage of a Chu or a Kuei.
[Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu State
and contemporary with Sun Tzu himself, who was employed by Kung-tzu Kuang,
better known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his sovereign Wang Liao with a
dagger which he secreted in the belly of a fish served up at a banquet. He
succeeded in his attempt, but was immediately hacked to pieced by the king's
bodyguard. This was in 515 B.C. The other hero referred to, Ts`ao Kuei (or
Ts`ao Mo), performed the exploit which has made his name famous 166 years
earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice defeated by Ch`i, and was just about
to conclude a treaty surrendering a large slice of territory, when Ts`ao Kuei
suddenly seized Huan Kung, the Duke of Ch`i, as he stood on the altar steps
and held a dagger against his chest. None of the duke's retainers dared to
move a muscle, and Ts`ao Kuei proceeded to demand full restitution, declaring
the Lu was being unjustly treated because she was a smaller and a weaker
state. Huan Kung, in peril of his life, was obliged to consent, whereupon
Ts`ao Kuei flung away his dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the
terrified assemblage without having so much as changed color. As was to be
expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the bargain, but his wise
old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him the impolicy of breaking his word,
and the upshot was that this bold stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she
had lost in three pitched battles.]
29. The skillful tactician may be
likened to the SHUAI-JAN. Now the SHUAI-JAN is a snake that is found in the
Ch`ang mountains.
["Shuai-jan" means "suddenly" or
"rapidly," and the snake in question was doubtless so called owing
to the rapidity of its movements. Through this passage, the term in the
Chinese has now come to be used in the sense of "military
maneuvers."]
Strike at its head, and you will
be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you will be attacked by its
head; strike at its middle, and you will be attacked by head and tail both.
30. Asked if an army can be made
to imitate the SHUAI-JAN,
[That is, as Mei Yao-ch`en says, "Is it possible to make the
front and rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on the other, just
as though they were part of a single living body?"]
I should answer, Yes. For the men
of Wu and the men of Yueh are enemies;
[Cf. VI. ss. 21.]
yet if they are crossing a river
in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come to each other's
assistance just as the left hand helps the right.
[The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a time of
common peril, how much more should two parts of the same army, bound together
as they are by every tie of interest and fellow-feeling. Yet it is notorious
that many a campaign has been ruined through lack of cooperation, especially
in the case of allied armies.]
31. Hence it is not enough to put
one's trust in the tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in
the ground
[These quaint devices to prevent one's army from running away
recall the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor with him at the
battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened himself firmly to one spot.
[See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not enough, says Sun Tzu, to render flight
impossible by such mechanical means. You will not succeed unless your men have
tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of sympathetic
cooperation. This is the lesson which can be learned from the SHUAI-JAN.]
32. The principle on which to
manage an army is to set up one standard of courage which all must reach.
[Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were
that of] one." If the ideal army is to form a single organic whole, then
it follows that the resolution and spirit of its component parts must be of
the same quality, or at any rate must not fall below a certain standard.
Wellington's seemingly ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as
"the worst he had ever commanded" meant no more than that it was
deficient in this important particular--unity of spirit and courage. Had he
not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept those troops in the
background, he would almost certainly have lost the day.]
33. How to make the best of both
strong and weak--that is a question involving the proper use of ground.
[Mei Yao-ch`en's paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the
differences of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to utilize
accidental features of the ground." Less reliable troops, if posted in
strong positions, will hold out as long as better troops on more exposed
terrain. The advantage of position neutralizes the inferiority in stamina and
courage. Col. Henderson says: "With all respect to the text books, and to
the ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study of
ground is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficient importance is
attached to the selection of positions... and to the immense advantages that
are to be derived, whether you are defending or attacking, from the proper
utilization of natural features." ]
34. Thus the skillful general
conducts his army just as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by
the hand.
[Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with which
he does it."]
35. It is the business of a
general to be quiet and thus ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus
maintain order.
36. He must be able to mystify
his officers and men by false reports and appearances,
[Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."]
and thus keep them in total
ignorance.
[Ts`ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: "The
troops must not be allowed to share your schemes in the beginning; they may
only rejoice with you over their happy outcome." "To mystify,
mislead, and surprise the enemy," is one of the first principles in war,
as had been frequently pointed out. But how about the other process--the
mystification of one's own men? Those who may think that Sun Tzu is
over-emphatic on this point would do well to read Col. Henderson's remarks on
Stonewall Jackson's Valley campaign: "The infinite pains," he says,
"with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most trusted staff
officers, his movements, his intentions, and his thoughts, a commander less
thorough would have pronounced useless"--etc. etc. In the year 88 A.D.,
as we read in ch. 47 of the HOU HAN SHU, "Pan Ch`ao took the field with
25,000 men from Khotan and other Central Asian states with the object of
crushing Yarkand. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his chief
commander to succor the place with an army drawn from the kingdoms of Wen-su,
Ku-mo, and Wei-t`ou, totaling 50,000 men. Pan Ch`ao summoned his officers and
also the King of Khotan to a council of war, and said: 'Our forces are now
outnumbered and unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan, then, is
for us to separate and disperse, each in a different direction. The King of
Khotan will march away by the easterly route, and I will then return myself
towards the west. Let us wait until the evening drum has sounded and then
start.' Pan Ch`ao now secretly released the prisoners whom he had taken alive,
and the King of Kutcha was thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the
news, the latter set off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar Pan
Ch`ao's retreat in the west, while the King of Wen-su rode eastward with 8000
horse in order to intercept the King of Khotan. As soon as Pan Ch`ao knew that
the two chieftains had gone, he called his divisions together, got them well
in hand, and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of Yarkand, as it lay
encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion, and were closely
pursued by Pan Ch`ao. Over 5000 heads were brought back as trophies, besides
immense spoils in the shape of horses and cattle and valuables of every
description. Yarkand then capitulating, Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off
their respective forces. From that time forward, Pan Ch`ao's prestige
completely overawed the countries of the west." In this case, we see that
the Chinese general not only kept his own officers in ignorance of his real
plans, but actually took the bold step of dividing his army in order to
deceive the enemy.]
37. By altering his arrangements
and changing his plans,
[Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same stratagem
twice.]
he keeps the enemy without
definite knowledge.
[Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says: "The axiom,
that war is based on deception, does not apply only to deception of the enemy.
You must deceive even your own soldiers. Make them follow you, but without
letting them know why."]
By shifting his camp and taking
circuitous routes, he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose.
38. At the critical moment, the
leader of an army acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks
away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory
before he shows his hand.
[Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. ss. 15), that
is, takes some decisive step which makes it impossible for the army to
return--like Hsiang Yu, who sunk his ships after crossing a river. Ch`en Hao,
followed by Chia Lin, understands the words less well as "puts forth
every artifice at his command."]
39. He burns his boats and breaks
his cooking-pots; like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men
this way and that, and nothing knows whither he is going.
[Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of orders to advance
or retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of attacking and
conquering."]
40. To muster his host and bring
it into danger:--this may be termed the business of the general.
[Sun Tzu means that after mobilization there should be no delay in
aiming a blow at the enemy's heart. Note how he returns again and again to
this point. Among the warring states of ancient China, desertion was no doubt
a much more present fear and serious evil than it is in the armies of today.]
41. The different measures suited
to the nine varieties of ground;
[Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting
the rules for the nine varieties of ground.]
the expediency of aggressive or
defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature: these are things
that must most certainly be studied.
42. When invading hostile
territory, the general principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion;
penetrating but a short way means dispersion.
[Cf. supra, ss. 20.]
43. When you leave your own
country behind, and take your army across neighborhood territory, you find
yourself on critical ground.
[This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. ss. 2, but
it does not figure among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities in chap. X.
One's first impulse would be to translate it distant ground," but this,
if we can trust the commentators, is precisely what is not meant here. Mei
Yao-ch`en says it is "a position not far enough advanced to be called
'facile,' and not near enough to home to be 'dispersive,' but something
between the two." Wang Hsi says: "It is ground separated from home
by an interjacent state, whose territory we have had to cross in order to
reach it. Hence, it is incumbent on us to settle our business there
quickly." He adds that this position is of rare occurrence, which is the
reason why it is not included among the Nine Situations.]
When there are means of
communication on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways.
44. When you penetrate deeply
into a country, it is serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way, it
is facile ground.
45. When you have the enemy's
strongholds on your rear, and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground.
When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.
46. Therefore, on dispersive
ground, I would inspire my men with unity of purpose.
[This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining on the
defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. supra, ss. 11.]
On facile ground, I would see
that there is close connection between all parts of my army.
[As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible
contingencies: "(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a sudden attack
on the part of the enemy." Cf. VII. ss. 17. Mei Yao-ch`en says: "On
the march, the regiments should be in close touch; in an encampment, there
should be continuity between the fortifications."]
47. On contentious ground, I
would hurry up my rear.
[This is Ts`ao Kung's interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, saying:
"We must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and tail may both reach
the goal." That is, they must not be allowed to straggle up a long way
apart. Mei Yao-ch`en offers another equally plausible explanation:
"Supposing the enemy has not yet reached the coveted position, and we are
behind him, we should advance with all speed in order to dispute its
possession." Ch`en Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy has
had time to select his own ground, quotes VI. ss. 1, where Sun Tzu warns us
against coming exhausted to the attack. His own idea of the situation is
rather vaguely expressed: "If there is a favorable position lying in
front of you, detach a picked body of troops to occupy it, then if the enemy,
relying on their numbers, come up to make a fight for it, you may fall quickly
on their rear with your main body, and victory will be assured." It was
thus, he adds, that Chao She beat the army of Ch`in. (See p. 57.)]
48. On open ground, I would keep
a vigilant eye on my defenses. On ground of intersecting highways, I would
consolidate my alliances.
49. On serious ground, I would
try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies.
[The commentators take this as referring to forage and plunder,
not, as one might expect, to an unbroken communication with a home base.]
On difficult ground, I would keep
pushing on along the road.
50. On hemmed-in ground, I would
block any way of retreat.
[Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend the
position, whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly through the enemy's
lines." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "in order to make my soldiers fight with
desperation." Wang Hsi says, "fearing lest my men be tempted to run
away." Tu Mu points out that this is the converse of VII. ss. 36, where
it is the enemy who is surrounded. In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor
and canonized as Shen-wu, was surrounded by a great army under Erh- chu Chao
and others. His own force was comparatively small, consisting only of 2000
horse and something under 30,000 foot. The lines of investment had not been
drawn very closely together, gaps being left at certain points. But Kao Huan,
instead of trying to escape, actually made a shift to block all the remaining
outlets himself by driving into them a number of oxen and donkeys roped
together. As soon as his officers and men saw that there was nothing for it
but to conquer or die, their spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of
exaltation, and they charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing
ranks broke and crumbled under their onslaught.]
On desperate ground, I would
proclaim to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives.
Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away
your stores and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your cooking-stoves,
and make it plain to your men that they cannot survive, but must fight to the
death." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "The only chance of life lies in giving
up all hope of it." This concludes what Sun Tzu has to say about
"grounds" and the "variations" corresponding to them.
Reviewing the passages which bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to
be struck by the desultory and unmethodical fashion in which it is treated.
Sun Tzu begins abruptly in VIII. ss. 2 to enumerate "variations"
before touching on "grounds" at all, but only mentions five, namely
nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that is not included in it.
A few varieties of ground are dealt with in the earlier portion of chap. IX,
and then chap. X sets forth six new grounds, with six variations of plan to
match. None of these is mentioned again, though the first is hardly to be
distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next chapter. At last, in chap. XI, we
come to the Nine Grounds par excellence, immediately followed by the
variations. This takes us down to ss. 14. In SS. 43-45, fresh definitions are
provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, 8 and 9 (in the order given), as well as for the
tenth ground noticed in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are
enumerated once more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6
and 7, being different from those previously given. Though it is impossible to
account for the present state of Sun Tzu's text, a few suggestive facts maybe
brought into prominence: (1) Chap. VIII, according to the title, should deal
with nine variations, whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally short
chapter. (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. Several of these are
defined twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists of the
corresponding variations. (4) The length of the chapter is disproportionate,
being double that of any other except IX. I do not propose to draw any
inferences from these facts, beyond the general conclusion that Sun Tzu's work
cannot have come down to us in the shape in which it left his hands: chap.
VIII is obviously defective and probably out of place, while XI seems to
contain matter that has either been added by a later hand or ought to appear
elsewhere.]
51. For it is the soldier's
disposition to offer an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard
when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into
danger.
[Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch`ao's devoted followers
in 73 A.D. The story runs thus in the HOU HAN SHU, ch. 47: "When Pan
Ch`ao arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the country, received him at
first with great politeness and respect; but shortly afterwards his behavior
underwent a sudden change, and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Ch`ao spoke
about this to the officers of his suite: 'Have you noticed,' he said, 'that
Kuang's polite intentions are on the wane? This must signify that envoys have
come from the Northern barbarians, and that consequently he is in a state of
indecision, not knowing with which side to throw in his lot. That surely is
the reason. The truly wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they
have come to pass; how much more, then, those that are already manifest!'
Thereupon he called one of the natives who had been assigned to his service,
and set a trap for him, saying: 'Where are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who
arrived some day ago?' The man was so taken aback that between surprise and
fear he presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch`ao, keeping his
informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a general gathering of
his officers, thirty-six in all, and began drinking with them. When the wine
had mounted into their heads a little, he tried to rouse their spirit still
further by addressing them thus: 'Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an
isolated region, anxious to achieve riches and honor by some great exploit.
Now it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no arrived in this kingdom
only a few days ago, and the result is that the respectful courtesy extended
towards us by our royal host has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail upon
him to seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-no, our bones will
become food for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?' With one accord,
the officers replied: 'Standing as we do in peril of our lives, we will follow
our commander through life and death.' For the sequel of this adventure, see
chap. XII. ss. 1, note.]
52. We cannot enter into alliance
with neighboring princes until we are acquainted with their designs. We are
not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of
the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its
marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account
unless we make use of local guides.
[These three sentences are repeated from VII. SS. 12-14 -- in order
to emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to think. I prefer to
regard them as interpolated here in order to form an antecedent to the
following words. With regard to local guides, Sun Tzu might have added that
there is always the risk of going wrong, either through their treachery or
some misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13): Hannibal, we are told,
ordered a guide to lead him into the neighborhood of Casinum, where there was
an important pass to be occupied; but his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the
pronunciation of Latin names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead
of Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in that
direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had almost arrived.]
53. To be ignored of any one of
the following four or five principles does not befit a warlike prince.
54. When a warlike prince attacks
a powerful state, his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration
of the enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents, and their allies are
prevented from joining against him.
[Mei Tao-ch`en constructs one of the chains of reasoning that are
so much affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a powerful state, if you
can divide her forces, you will have a superiority in strength; if you have a
superiority in strength, you will overawe the enemy; if you overawe the enemy,
the neighboring states will be frightened; and if the neighboring states are
frightened, the enemy's allies will be prevented from joining her." The
following gives a stronger meaning: "If the great state has once been
defeated (before she has had time to summon her allies), then the lesser
states will hold aloof and refrain from massing their forces." Ch`en Hao
and Chang Yu take the sentence in quite another way. The former says:
"Powerful though a prince may be, if he attacks a large state, he will be
unable to raise enough troops, and must rely to some extent on external aid;
if he dispenses with this, and with overweening confidence in his own
strength, simply tries to intimidate the enemy, he will surely be
defeated." Chang Yu puts his view thus: "If we recklessly attack a
large state, our own people will be discontented and hang back. But if (as
will then be the case) our display of military force is inferior by half to
that of the enemy, the other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join
us."]
55. Hence he does not strive to
ally himself with all and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other
states. He carries out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe.
[The train of thought, as said by Li Ch`uan, appears to be this:
Secure against a combination of his enemies, "he can afford to reject
entangling alliances and simply pursue his own secret designs, his prestige
enable him to dispense with external friendships."]
Thus he is able to capture their
cities and overthrow their kingdoms.
[This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch`in State
became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy by which the
famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for her final triumph under
Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yu, following up his previous note, thinks that Sun Tzu
is condemning this attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty
isolation.]
56. Bestow rewards without regard
to rule,
[Wu Tzu (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly
rewarded and retreat be heavily punished."]
issue orders
[Literally, "hang" or post up."]
without regard to previous
arrangements;
["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The
general meaning is made clear by Ts`ao Kung's quotation from the SSU-MA FA:
"Give instructions only on sighting the enemy; give rewards when you see
deserving deeds." Ts`ao Kung's paraphrase: "The final instructions
you give to your army should not correspond with those that have been
previously posted up." Chang Yu simplifies this into "your
arrangements should not be divulged beforehand." And Chia Lin says:
"there should be no fixity in your rules and arrangements." Not only
is there danger in letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates the
entire reversal of them at the last moment.]
and you will be able to handle a
whole army as though you had to do with but a single man.
[Cf. supra, ss. 34.]
57. Confront your soldiers with
the deed itself; never let them know your design.
[Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give
your reasons for any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior colleague to
"give no reasons" for his decisions, and the maxim is even more
applicable to a general than to a judge.]
When the outlook is bright, bring
it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when the situation is gloomy.
58. Place your army in deadly
peril, and it will survive; plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come
off in safety.
[These words of Sun Tzu were once quoted by Han Hsin in explanation
of the tactics he employed in one of his most brilliant battles, already
alluded to on p. 28. In 204 B.C., he was sent against the army of Chao, and
halted ten miles from the mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the enemy had
mustered in full force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body of 2000 light
cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a red flag. Their instructions
were to make their way through narrow defiles and keep a secret watch on the
enemy. "When the men of Chao see me in full flight," Han Hsin said,
"they will abandon their fortifications and give chase. This must be the
sign for you to rush in, pluck down the Chao standards and set up the red
banners of Han in their stead." Turning then to his other officers, he
remarked: "Our adversary holds a strong position, and is not likely to
come out and attack us until he sees the standard and drums of the
commander-in-chief, for fear I should turn back and escape through the
mountains." So saying, he first of all sent out a division consisting of
10,000 men, and ordered them to form in line of battle with their backs to the
River Ti. Seeing this maneuver, the whole army of Chao broke into loud
laughter. By this time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the
generalissimo's flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, and was
immediately engaged by the enemy. A great battle followed, lasting for some
time; until at length Han Hsin and his colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums and
banner on the field, fled to the division on the river bank, where another
fierce battle was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure
the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but the two generals
succeeded in joining the other army, which was fighting with the utmost
desperation. The time had now come for the 2000 horsemen to play their part.
As soon as they saw the men of Chao following up their advantage, they
galloped behind the deserted walls, tore up the enemy's flags and replaced
them by those of Han. When the Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the
sight of these red flags struck them with terror. Convinced that the Hans had
got in and overpowered their king, they broke up in wild disorder, every
effort of their leader to stay the panic being in vain. Then the Han army fell
on them from both sides and completed the rout, killing a number and capturing
the rest, amongst whom was King Ya himself.... After the battle, some of Han
Hsin's officers came to him and said: "In the ART OF WAR we are told to
have a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a river or marsh on the left
front. [This appears to be a blend of Sun Tzu and T`ai Kung. See IX ss. 9, and
note.] You, on the contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the river
at our back. Under these conditions, how did you manage to gain the
victory?" The general replied: "I fear you gentlemen have not
studied the Art of War with sufficient care. Is it not written there: 'Plunge
your army into desperate straits and it will come off in safety; place it in
deadly peril and it will survive'? Had I taken the usual course, I should
never have been able to bring my colleague round. What says the Military
Classic--'Swoop down on the market-place and drive the men off to fight.'
[This passage does not occur in the present text of Sun Tzu.] If I had not
placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to fight for their
lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own discretion, there would have
been a general debandade, and it would have been impossible to do anything
with them." The officers admitted the force of his argument, and said:
"These are higher tactics than we should have been capable of." [See
CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch. 34, ff. 4, 5.] ]
59. For it is precisely when a
force has fallen into harm's way that is capable of striking a blow for
victory.
[Danger has a bracing effect.]
60. Success in warfare is gained
by carefully accommodating ourselves to the enemy's purpose.
[Ts`ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity"--by an appearance of
yielding and falling in with the enemy's wishes. Chang Yu's note makes the
meaning clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to advance, lure him on
to do so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay on purpose that he may carry out
his intention." The object is to make him remiss and contemptuous before
we deliver our attack.]
61. By persistently hanging on
the enemy's flank,
[I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the
enemy in one direction." Ts`ao Kung says: "unite the soldiers and
make for the enemy." But such a violent displacement of characters is
quite indefensible.]
we shall succeed in the long run
[Literally, "after a thousand LI."]
in killing the
commander-in-chief.
[Always a great point with the Chinese.]
62. This is called ability to
accomplish a thing by sheer cunning.
63. On the day that you take up
your command, block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies,
[These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was issued
as a permit or passport by the official in charge of a gate. Cf. the
"border-warden" of LUN YU III. 24, who may have had similar duties.
When this half was returned to him, within a fixed period, he was authorized
to open the gate and let the traveler through.]
and stop the passage of all
emissaries.
[Either to or from the enemy's country.]
64. Be stern in the
council-chamber,
[Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified by the
sovereign.]
so that you may control the
situation.
[Mei Yao-ch`en understands the whole sentence to mean: Take the
strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in your deliberations.]
65. If the enemy leaves a door
open, you must rush in.
66. Forestall your opponent by
seizing what he holds dear,
[Cf. supra, ss. 18.]
and subtly contrive to time his
arrival on the ground.
[Ch`en Hao`s explanation: "If I manage to seize a favorable
position, but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the advantage thus
obtained cannot be turned to any practical account. He who intends therefore,
to occupy a position of importance to the enemy, must begin by making an
artful appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him into
going there as well." Mei Yao-ch`en explains that this "artful
appointment" is to be made through the medium of the enemy's own spies,
who will carry back just the amount of information that we choose to give
them. Then, having cunningly disclosed our intentions, "we must manage,
though starting after the enemy, to arrive before him (VII. ss. 4). We must
start after him in order to ensure his marching thither; we must arrive before
him in order to capture the place without trouble. Taken thus, the present
passage lends some support to Mei Yao-ch`en's interpretation of ss. 47.]
67. Walk in the path defined by
rule,
[Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters, and
this cannot be achieved by adhering to conventional canons." It is
unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight authority, for the sense
yielded is certainly much more satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know, according
to the veterans of the old school whom he defeated, won his battles by
violating every accepted canon of warfare.]
and accommodate yourself to the
enemy until you can fight a decisive battle.
[Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy's tactics until a favorable
opportunity offers; then come forth and engage in a battle that shall prove
decisive."]
68. At first, then, exhibit the
coyness of a maiden, until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate
the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to
oppose you.
[As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the comparison
hardly appears felicitous. But of course Sun Tzu was thinking only of its
speed. The words have been taken to mean: You must flee from the enemy as
quickly as an escaping hare; but this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.]
[Rather more than half the chapter (SS. 1-13) is devoted to the
subject of fire, after which the author branches off into other topics.]
1. Sun Tzu said: There are five
ways of attacking with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp;
[So Tu Mu. Li Ch`uan says: "Set fire to the camp, and kill the
soldiers" (when they try to escape from the flames). Pan Ch`ao, sent on a
diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see XI. ss. 51, note], found
himself placed in extreme peril by the unexpected arrival of an envoy from the
Hsiung-nu [the mortal enemies of the Chinese]. In consultation with his
officers, he exclaimed: "Never venture, never win! [1]
The only course open to us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians
under cover of night, when they will not be able to discern our numbers.
Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate them completely; this will cool
the King's courage and cover us with glory, besides ensuring the success of
our mission.' the officers all replied that it would be necessary to discuss
the matter first with the Intendant. Pan Ch`ao then fell into a passion: 'It
is today,' he cried, 'that our fortunes must be decided! The Intendant is only
a humdrum civilian, who on hearing of our project will certainly be afraid,
and everything will be brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy fate
for valiant warriors.' All then agreed to do as he wished. Accordingly, as
soon as night came on, he and his little band quickly made their way to the
barbarian camp. A strong gale was blowing at the time. Pan Ch`ao ordered ten
of the party to take drums and hide behind the enemy's barracks, it being
arranged that when they saw flames shoot up, they should begin drumming and
yelling with all their might. The rest of his men, armed with bows and
crossbows, he posted in ambuscade at the gate of the camp. He then set fire to
the place from the windward side, whereupon a deafening noise of drums and
shouting arose on the front and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out
pell-mell in frantic disorder. Pan Ch`ao slew three of them with his own hand,
while his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and thirty of his suite.
The remainder, more than a hundred in all, perished in the flames. On the
following day, Pan Ch`ao, divining his thoughts, said with uplifted hand:
'Although you did not go with us last night, I should not think, Sir, of
taking sole credit for our exploit.' This satisfied Kuo Hsun, and Pan Ch`ao,
having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the head of the barbarian
envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with fear and trembling, which Pan Ch`ao
took steps to allay by issuing a public proclamation. Then, taking the king's
sons as hostage, he returned to make his report to Tou Ku." HOU HAN SHU,
ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ]
the second is to burn stores;
[Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order to
subdue the rebellious population of Kiangnan, Kao Keng recommended Wen Ti of
the Sui dynasty to make periodical raids and burn their stores of grain, a
policy which in the long run proved entirely successful.]
the third is to burn baggage
trains;
[An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao`s wagons and
impedimenta by Ts`ao Ts`ao in 200 A.D.]
the fourth is to burn arsenals
and magazines;
[Tu Mu says that the things contained in "arsenals" and
"magazines" are the same. He specifies weapons and other implements,
bullion and clothing. Cf. VII. ss. 11.]
the fifth is to hurl dropping
fire amongst the enemy.
[Tu Yu says in the T`UNG TIEN: "To drop fire into the enemy's
camp. The method by which this may be done is to set the tips of arrows alight
by dipping them into a brazier, and then shoot them from powerful crossbows
into the enemy's lines."]
2. In order to carry out an
attack, we must have means available.
[T`sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy's camp"
are referred to. But Ch`en Hao is more likely to be right in saying: "We
must have favorable circumstances in general, not merely traitors to help
us." Chia Lin says: "We must avail ourselves of wind and dry
weather."]
the material for raising fire
should always be kept in readiness.
[Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire: "dry vegetable
matter, reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc." Here we have the
material cause. Chang Yu says: "vessels for hoarding fire, stuff for
lighting fires."]
3. There is a proper season for
making attacks with fire, and special days for starting a conflagration.
4. The proper season is when the
weather is very dry; the special days are those when the moon is in the
constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar;
[These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of the
Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to Sagittarius, Pegasus,
Crater and Corvus.]
for these four are all days of
rising wind.
5. In attacking with fire, one
should be prepared to meet five possible developments:
6. (1) When fire breaks out
inside to enemy's camp, respond at once with an attack from without.
7. (2) If there is an outbreak of
fire, but the enemy's soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack.
[The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the enemy into
confusion. If this effect is not produced, it means that the enemy is ready to
receive us. Hence the necessity for caution.]
8. (3) When the force of the
flames has reached its height, follow it up with an attack, if that is
practicable; if not, stay where you are.
[Ts`ao Kung says: "If you see a possible way, advance; but if
you find the difficulties too great, retire."]
9. (4) If it is possible to make
an assault with fire from without, do not wait for it to break out within, but
deliver your attack at a favorable moment.
[Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to the fire
breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by the agency of
incendiaries) inside the enemy's camp. "But," he continues, "if
the enemy is settled in a waste place littered with quantities of grass, or if
he has pitched his camp in a position which can be burnt out, we must carry
our fire against him at any seasonable opportunity, and not await on in hopes
of an outbreak occurring within, for fear our opponents should themselves burn
up the surrounding vegetation, and thus render our own attempts
fruitless." The famous Li Ling once baffled the leader of the Hsiung-nu
in this way. The latter, taking advantage of a favorable wind, tried to set
fire to the Chinese general's camp, but found that every scrap of combustible
vegetation in the neighborhood had already been burnt down. On the other hand,
Po-ts`ai, a general of the Yellow Turban rebels, was badly defeated in 184
A.D. through his neglect of this simple precaution. "At the head of a
large army he was besieging Ch`ang-she, which was held by Huang-fu Sung. The
garrison was very small, and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded the
ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together and said: "In war,
there are various indirect methods of attack, and numbers do not count for
everything. [The commentator here quotes Sun Tzu, V. SS. 5, 6 and 10.] Now the
rebels have pitched their camp in the midst of thick grass which will easily
burn when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night, they will be thrown
into a panic, and we can make a sortie and attack them on all sides at once,
thus emulating the achievement of T`ien Tan.' [See p. 90.] That same evening,
a strong breeze sprang up; so Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind
reeds together into torches and mount guard on the city walls, after which he
sent out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their way through the lines
and started the fire with loud shouts and yells. Simultaneously, a glare of
light shot up from the city walls, and Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led
a rapid charge, which threw the rebels into confusion and put them to headlong
flight." [HOU HAN SHU, ch. 71.] ]
10. (5) When you start a fire, be
to windward of it. Do not attack from the leeward.
[Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you make a fire, the
enemy will retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat and attack him
then, he will fight desperately, which will not conduce to your success."
A rather more obvious explanation is given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in
the east, begin burning to the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack
yourself from that side. If you start the fire on the east side, and then
attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your enemy."]
11. A wind that rises in the
daytime lasts long, but a night breeze soon falls.
[Cf. Lao Tzu's saying: "A violent wind does not last the space
of a morning." (TAO TE CHING, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch`en and Wang Hsi say:
"A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a night breeze at daybreak.
This is what happens as a general rule." The phenomenon observed may be
correct enough, but how this sense is to be obtained is not apparent.]
12. In every army, the five
developments connected with fire must be known, the movements of the stars
calculated, and a watch kept for the proper days.
[Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations as to the paths of the
stars, and watch for the days on which wind will rise, before making our
attack with fire." Chang Yu seems to interpret the text differently:
"We must not only know how to assail our opponents with fire, but also be
on our guard against similar attacks from them."]
13. Hence those who use fire as
an aid to the attack show intelligence; those who use water as an aid to the
attack gain an accession of strength.
14. By means of water, an enemy
may be intercepted, but not robbed of all his belongings.
[Ts`ao Kung's note is: "We can merely obstruct the enemy's
road or divide his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated stores."
Water can do useful service, but it lacks the terrible destructive power of
fire. This is the reason, Chang Yu concludes, why the former is dismissed in a
couple of sentences, whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail. Wu Tzu
(ch. 4) speaks thus of the two elements: "If an army is encamped on
low-lying marshy ground, from which the water cannot run off, and where the
rainfall is heavy, it may be submerged by a flood. If an army is encamped in
wild marsh lands thickly overgrown with weeds and brambles, and visited by
frequent gales, it may be exterminated by fire."]
15. Unhappy is the fate of one
who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating
the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general
stagnation.
[This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzu. Ts`ao Kung
says: "Rewards for good service should not be deferred a single
day." And Tu Mu: "If you do not take opportunity to advance and
reward the deserving, your subordinates will not carry out your commands, and
disaster will ensue." For several reasons, however, and in spite of the
formidable array of scholars on the other side, I prefer the interpretation
suggested by Mei Yao-ch`en alone, whose words I will quote: "Those who
want to make sure of succeeding in their battles and assaults must seize the
favorable moments when they come and not shrink on occasion from heroic
measures: that is to say, they must resort to such means of attack of fire,
water and the like. What they must not do, and what will prove fatal, is to
sit still and simply hold to the advantages they have got."]
16. Hence the saying: The
enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his
resources.
[Tu Mu quotes the following from the SAN LUEH, ch. 2: "The
warlike prince controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them together by
good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable. If faith decays, there will
be disruption; if rewards are deficient, commands will not be
respected."]
17. Move not unless you see an
advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight
not unless the position is critical.
[Sun Tzu may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he never goes
so far in that direction as the remarkable passage in the TAO TE CHING, ch.
69. "I dare not take the initiative, but prefer to act on the defensive;
I dare not advance an inch, but prefer to retreat a foot."]
18. No ruler should put troops
into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a
battle simply out of pique.
19. If it is to your advantage,
make a forward move; if not, stay where you are.
[This is repeated from XI. ss. 17. Here I feel convinced that it is
an interpolation, for it is evident that ss. 20 ought to follow immediately on
ss. 18.]
20. Anger may in time change to
gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content.
21. But a kingdom that has once
been destroyed can never come again into being;
[The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of this
saying.]
nor can the dead ever be brought
back to life.
22. Hence the enlightened ruler
is heedful, and the good general full of caution. This is the way to keep a
country at peace and an army intact.
1. "Unless you enter the tiger's lair, you cannot get hold of
the tiger's cubs."
1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host
of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss
on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily expenditure
will amount to a thousand ounces of silver.
[Cf. II. ss. ss. 1, 13, 14.]
There will be commotion at home
and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on the highways.
[Cf. TAO TE CHING, ch. 30: "Where troops have been quartered,
brambles and thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: "We may be reminded
of the saying: 'On serious ground, gather in plunder.' Why then should
carriage and transportation cause exhaustion on the highways?--The answer is,
that not victuals alone, but all sorts of munitions of war have to be conveyed
to the army. Besides, the injunction to 'forage on the enemy' only means that
when an army is deeply engaged in hostile territory, scarcity of food must be
provided against. Hence, without being solely dependent on the enemy for corn,
we must forage in order that there may be an uninterrupted flow of supplies.
Then, again, there are places like salt deserts where provisions being
unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be dispensed with."]
As many as seven hundred thousand
families will be impeded in their labor.
[Mei Yao-ch`en says: "Men will be lacking at the plough-
tail." The allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine parts,
each consisting of about 15 acres, the plot in the center being cultivated on
behalf of the State by the tenants of the other eight. It was here also, so Tu
Mu tells us, that their cottages were built and a well sunk, to be used by all
in common. [See II. ss. 12, note.] In time of war, one of the families had to
serve in the army, while the other seven contributed to its support. Thus, by
a levy of 100,000 men (reckoning one able- bodied soldier to each family) the
husbandry of 700,000 families would be affected.]
2. Hostile armies may face each
other for years, striving for the victory which is decided in a single day.
This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because
one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments,
["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would
spoil the effect of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were actually
mentioned at this point.]
is the height of inhumanity.
[Sun Tzu's agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by adverting
to the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood and treasure which war
always brings in its train. Now, unless you are kept informed of the enemy's
condition, and are ready to strike at the right moment, a war may drag on for
years. The only way to get this information is to employ spies, and it is
impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly paid for their
services. But it is surely false economy to grudge a comparatively trifling
amount for this purpose, when every day that the war lasts eats up an
incalculably greater sum. This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the
poor, and hence Sun Tzu concludes that to neglect the use of spies is nothing
less than a crime against humanity.]
3. One who acts thus is no leader
of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory.
[This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its root in
the national temperament of the Chinese. Even so far back as 597 B.C., these
memorable words were uttered by Prince Chuang of the Ch`u State: "The
[Chinese] character for 'prowess' is made up of [the characters for] 'to stay'
and 'a spear' (cessation of hostilities). Military prowess is seen in the
repression of cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the preservation of the
appointment of Heaven, the firm establishment of merit, the bestowal of
happiness on the people, putting harmony between the princes, the diffusion of
wealth."]
4. Thus, what enables the wise
sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things
beyond the reach of ordinary men, is FOREKNOWLEDGE.
[That is, knowledge of the enemy's dispositions, and what he means
to do.]
5. Now this foreknowledge cannot
be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience,
[Tu Mu's note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be gained
by reasoning from other analogous cases."]
nor by any deductive calculation.
[Li Ch`uan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, distance
and magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical determination; human
actions cannot be so calculated."]
6. Knowledge of the enemy's
dispositions can only be obtained from other men.
[Mei Yao-ch`en has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge of
the spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information in natural
science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws of the universe can be
verified by mathematical calculation: but the dispositions of an enemy are
ascertainable through spies and spies alone."]
7. Hence the use of spies, of
whom there are five classes: (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted
spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies.
8. When these five kinds of spy
are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called
"divine manipulation of the threads." It is the sovereign's most
precious faculty.
[Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all cavalry
leaders, had officers styled 'scout masters,' whose business it was to collect
all possible information regarding the enemy, through scouts and spies, etc.,
and much of his success in war was traceable to the previous knowledge of the
enemy's moves thus gained." [1]]
9. Having LOCAL SPIES means
employing the services of the inhabitants of a district.
[Tu Mu says: "In the enemy's country, win people over by kind
treatment, and use them as spies."]
10. Having INWARD SPIES, making
use of officials of the enemy.
[Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good
service in this respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from office,
criminals who have undergone punishment; also, favorite concubines who are
greedy for gold, men who are aggrieved at being in subordinate positions, or
who have been passed over in the distribution of posts, others who are anxious
that their side should be defeated in order that they may have a chance of
displaying their ability and talents, fickle turncoats who always want to have
a foot in each boat. Officials of these several kinds," he continues,
"should be secretly approached and bound to one's interests by means of
rich presents. In this way you will be able to find out the state of affairs
in the enemy's country, ascertain the plans that are being formed against you,
and moreover disturb the harmony and create a breach between the sovereign and
his ministers." The necessity for extreme caution, however, in dealing
with "inward spies," appears from an historical incident related by
Ho Shih: "Lo Shang, Governor of I-Chou, sent his general Wei Po to attack
the rebel Li Hsiung of Shu in his stronghold at P`i. After each side had
experienced a number of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the
services of a certain P`o-t`ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began to have him
whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to Lo Shang, whom he was
to delude by offering to cooperate with him from inside the city, and to give
a fire signal at the right moment for making a general assault. Lo Shang,
confiding in these promises, march out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po
and others at their head with orders to attack at P`o-t`ai's bidding.
Meanwhile, Li Hsiung's general, Li Hsiang, had prepared an ambuscade on their
line of march; and P`o-t`ai, having reared long scaling-ladders against the
city walls, now lighted the beacon-fire. Wei Po's men raced up on seeing the
signal and began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others were
drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred of Lo Shang's
soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of whom was forthwith
beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his forces, both inside and outside
the city, and routed the enemy completely." [This happened in 303 A.D. I
do not know where Ho Shih got the story from. It is not given in the biography
of Li Hsiung or that of his father Li T`e, CHIN SHU, ch. 120, 121.]
11. Having CONVERTED SPIES,
getting hold of the enemy's spies and using them for our own purposes.
[By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching them from
the enemy's service, and inducing them to carry back false information as well
as to spy in turn on their own countrymen. On the other hand, Hsiao Shih-hsien
says that we pretend not to have detected him, but contrive to let him carry
away a false impression of what is going on. Several of the commentators
accept this as an alternative definition; but that it is not what Sun Tzu
meant is conclusively proved by his subsequent remarks about treating the
converted spy generously (ss. 21 sqq.). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which
converted spies were used with conspicuous success: (1) by T`ien Tan in his
defense of Chi-mo (see supra, p. 90); (2) by Chao She on his march to O-yu
(see p. 57); and by the wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C., when Lien P`o was conducting
a defensive campaign against Ch`in. The King of Chao strongly disapproved of
Lien P`o's cautious and dilatory methods, which had been unable to avert a
series of minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of
his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and were already in Fan
Chu's pay. They said: "The only thing which causes Ch`in anxiety is lest
Chao Kua should be made general. Lien P`o they consider an easy opponent, who
is sure to be vanquished in the long run." Now this Chao Kua was a sun of
the famous Chao She. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed in the
study of war and military matters, until at last he came to believe that there
was no commander in the whole Empire who could stand against him. His father
was much disquieted by this overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which
he spoke of such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if ever
Kua was appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of Chao. This was
the man who, in spite of earnest protests from his own mother and the veteran
statesman Lin Hsiang-ju, was now sent to succeed Lien P`o. Needless to say, he
proved no match for the redoubtable Po Ch`i and the great military power of
Ch`in. He fell into a trap by which his army was divided into two and his
communications cut; and after a desperate resistance lasting 46 days, during
which the famished soldiers devoured one another, he was himself killed by an
arrow, and his whole force, amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly
put to the sword.]
12. Having DOOMED SPIES, doing
certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to
know of them and report them to the enemy.
[Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We
ostentatiously do thing calculated to deceive our own spies, who must be led
to believe that they have been unwittingly disclosed. Then, when these spies
are captured in the enemy's lines, they will make an entirely false report,
and the enemy will take measures accordingly, only to find that we do
something quite different. The spies will thereupon be put to death." As
an example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the prisoners released by Pan
Ch`ao in his campaign against Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He also refers to T`ang
Chien, who in 630 A.D. was sent by T`ai Tsung to lull the Turkish Kahn
Chieh-li into fancied security, until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing
blow against him. Chang Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing
T`ang Chien, but this is a mistake, for we read in both the old and the New
T`ang History (ch. 58, fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 respectively) that he escaped
and lived on until 656. Li I-chi played a somewhat similar part in 203 B.C.,
when sent by the King of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Ch`i. He has
certainly more claim to be described a "doomed spy", for the king of
Ch`i, being subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin, and infuriated
by what he considered the treachery of Li I-chi, ordered the unfortunate envoy
to be boiled alive.]
13. SURVIVING SPIES, finally, are
those who bring back news from the enemy's camp.
[This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, forming a
regular part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving spy must be a man
of keen intellect, though in outward appearance a fool; of shabby exterior,
but with a will of iron. He must be active, robust, endowed with physical
strength and courage; thoroughly accustomed to all sorts of dirty work, able
to endure hunger and cold, and to put up with shame and ignominy." Ho
Shih tells the following story of Ta`hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty: "When he
was governor of Eastern Ch`in, Shen-wu of Ch`i made a hostile movement upon
Sha-yuan. The Emperor T`ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] sent Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the
enemy. He was accompanied by two other men. All three were on horseback and
wore the enemy's uniform. When it was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet
away from the enemy's camp and stealthily crept up to listen, until they
succeeded in catching the passwords used in the army. Then they got on their
horses again and boldly passed through the camp under the guise of
night-watchmen; and more than once, happening to come across a soldier who was
committing some breach of discipline, they actually stopped to give the
culprit a sound cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest
possible information about the enemy's dispositions, and received warm
commendation from the Emperor, who in consequence of their report was able to
inflict a severe defeat on his adversary."]
14. Hence it is that which none
in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with
spies.
[Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch`en point out that the spy is privileged to
enter even the general's private sleeping-tent.]
None should be more liberally
rewarded. In no other business should greater secrecy be preserved.
[Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies should
be carried "mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies may be
quoted from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them than any previous
commander: "Spies are attached to those who give them most, he who pays
them ill is never served. They should never be known to anybody; nor should
they know one another. When they propose anything very material, secure their
persons, or have in your possession their wives and children as hostages for
their fidelity. Never communicate anything to them but what is absolutely
necessary that they should know.
15. Spies cannot be usefully
employed without a certain intuitive sagacity.
[Mei Yao-ch`en says: "In order to use them, one must know fact
from falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty and
double-dealing." Wang Hsi in a different interpretation thinks more along
the lines of "intuitive perception" and "practical
intelligence." Tu Mu strangely refers these attributes to the spies
themselves: "Before using spies we must assure ourselves as to their
integrity of character and the extent of their experience and skill." But
he continues: "A brazen face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous
than mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate such." So
that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the passage."]
16. They cannot be properly
managed without benevolence and straightforwardness.
[Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by substantial
offers, you must treat them with absolute sincerity; then they will work for
you with all their might."]
17. Without subtle ingenuity of
mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports.
[Mei Yao-ch`en says: "Be on your guard against the possibility
of spies going over to the service of the enemy."]
18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use
your spies for every kind of business.
[Cf. VI. ss. 9.]
19. If a secret piece of news is
divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together
with the man to whom the secret was told.
[Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters are
heard before [our plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzu's main point in
this passage is: Whereas you kill the spy himself "as a punishment for
letting out the secret," the object of killing the other man is only, as
Ch`en Hao puts it, "to stop his mouth" and prevent news leaking any
further. If it had already been repeated to others, this object would not be
gained. Either way, Sun Tzu lays himself open to the charge of inhumanity,
though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man deserves to be put to
death, for the spy would certainly not have told the secret unless the other
had been at pains to worm it out of him."]
20. Whether the object be to
crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always
necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-
camp,
[Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to
"those whose duty it is to keep the general supplied with
information," which naturally necessitates frequent interviews with him.]
and door-keepers and sentries of
the general in command. Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.
[As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of these
important functionaries can be won over by bribery.]
21. The enemy's spies who have
come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and
comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted spies and available for
our service.
22. It is through the information
brought by the converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and
inward spies.
[Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy's spies we learn
the enemy's condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt the
converted spy into our service, because it is he that knows which of the local
inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of the officials are open to
corruption."]
23. It is owing to his
information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to
the enemy.
[Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how the enemy
can best be deceived."]
24. Lastly, it is by his
information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions.
25. The end and aim of spying in
all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only
be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy.
[As explained in ss. 22-24. He not only brings information himself,
but makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to advantage.]
Hence it is essential that the
converted spy be treated with the utmost liberality.
26. Of old, the rise of the Yin
dynasty
[Sun Tzu means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its name was
changed to Yin by P`an Keng in 1401.]
was due to I Chih
[Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman who took
part in Ch`eng T`ang's campaign against Chieh Kuei.]
who had served under the Hsia.
Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty was due to Lu Ya
[Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, whom he
afterwards helped to overthrow. Popularly known as T`ai Kung, a title bestowed
on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have composed a treatise on war, erroneously
identified with the LIU T`AO.]
who had served under the Yin.
[There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought it well
to introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on the passage are by
no means explicit. But, having regard to the context, we can hardly doubt that
Sun Tzu is holding up I Chih and Lu Ya as illustrious examples of the
converted spy, or something closely analogous. His suggestion is, that the
Hsia and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the intimate knowledge of their
weaknesses and shortcoming which these former ministers were able to impart to
the other side. Mei Yao-ch`en appears to resent any such aspersion on these
historic names: "I Yin and Lu Ya," he says, "were not rebels
against the Government. Hsia could not employ the former, hence Yin employed
him. Yin could not employ the latter, hence Hou employed him. Their great
achievements were all for the good of the people." Ho Shih is also
indignant: "How should two divinely inspired men such as I and Lu have
acted as common spies? Sun Tzu's mention of them simply means that the proper
use of the five classes of spies is a matter which requires men of the highest
mental caliber like I and Lu, whose wisdom and capacity qualified them for the
task. The above words only emphasize this point." Ho Shih believes then
that the two heroes are mentioned on account of their supposed skill in the
use of spies. But this is very weak.]
27. Hence it is only the
enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence
of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results.
[Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just as water, which
carries a boat from bank to bank, may also be the means of sinking it, so
reliance on spies, while production of great results, is oft-times the cause
of utter destruction."]
Spies are a most important
element in water, because on them depends an army's ability to move.
[Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man with ears
or eyes.]
END.