III International Responses to the Boat People Tragedy
Initial
Worldwide Reception
‘A
humanitarian problem of historical proportions.’
‘Special
statement of the Tokyo Summit on Indochinese refugees’ by Britain,
Canada, France, Italy, Japan,
United States and West
Germany. June 1979

Mother Theresa was among those civic leaders
who publicly appealed to the world to help the boat people.
In response to the Vietnamese refugee tragedy, the peoples
around the world staged one of the greatest rescue efforts in mankind
history. The boat people’s sufferings awoke human conscience and invoked
individual compassion in the hearts and minds of citizens around the globe
and led them to engage in a massive humanitarian campaign to assist Asylees
in Southeast Asia. The boat people’s sufferings also exposed the most
inhuman and ugly side of power politics as played out by the superpowers and
various governments in their attempt to circumvent international collective
obligations. While individual citizens’ endeavor to help the boat people
was guided by compassion and humanitarianism, governments’ policies lacked
any clear direction and reflected bitter political bickering.
Hanoi’s
huge ‘Vietnamese gulag’[1]
and ‘policy of genocide’[2]
pushed millions of people to attempt seeking asylum overseas. Within
eight months following the fall of Saigon, of the unknown Vietnamese
escapees, 378 boat persons reached safety. In 1976, the number escalated to
5,569; in July of that year, the UNHCR issued its first appeal to the
international community to help the boat people.
A year later, 17,126 Vietnamese asylum-seekers arrived at various
ports in Southeast Asia; and that number increased to 87,164 in 1978 and
reached its peak at 201,189 in 1979. Michael
Davie, Editor of The Age, asserted
in October 1979 that: ‘.. the boat people are not merely another desperate swarm of
“displaced persons,” but the victims
and indicators of a profound regional instability.’[3]
Despite the urgent nature of the boat people
tragedy, however, most governments’ pre-1979 reaction[4]
was apathetic due to lack of leadership that was often provided by the
United States during major humanitarian crises. The Wall Street Journal
characterized this indifferent response to the Indochinese refugee tragedy
during the early years as ‘a scandal
in the house of decent men.’ The
U.S. phlegmatic policy reflected the then ‘no
more Vietnam’ attitude after the fall of Saigon in 1975. Washington
adopted an ad hoc policy with no
clear direction in dealing with Southeast Asian Asylee issue.
The
U.S. Attorney General exercised his parole power designed for emergencies to
admit and resettle the boat people. However, as the number of Vietnamese
refugees increased, the newly-elected Carter Administration felt compelled
to request additional parole authorizations even though the former Ford
cabinet had indicated to Congress that the May 1976 parole for Indochinese
refugees (mainly for Laotians)
would be the last. The additional August 1977 parole for 7,000 Vietnamese
and 8,000 Laotians could not cope with the continuing increase in the number
of arriving boat people. And thus, on January 25, 1978, a new parole was
again announced by the U.S. Attorney General.
Notwithstanding
the volcanic magnitude of the Indochinese refugee crisis, the U.S.
government failed to develop an unambiguous policy to deal with this new and
urgent development in Southeast Asia. The American lack of leadership led
other governments to the same path in dealing with Indochinese Asylees.
Washington wanted to internationalize the boat people issue so that other
nations would jointly assist in the resettlement process; however, the U.S.
lack of enthusiasm and halfhearted reception of refugees caused other
nations to react in a similar fashion. Most governments were reluctant to
get involved in what they viewed initially as an American problem brought
about by the U.S. betrayal of its ally, South Vietnam. Therefore, by the
early 1978, most nations had not resettled one single boat person; and the
unsettled refugees quickly became a residual problem for first-asylum
countries, which wanted assurance that ‘every
single refugee would be resettled within a reasonable time.’[5]
The apathetic government response during the initial years of the exodus
eventually led to adverse consequences, including the first-asylum
countries’ decision to withdraw their offer of temporary shelters for the
boat people and to prolong the refugees’ detention prior to resettlement
purposely to discourage potential Asylees from leaving Socialist Vietnam.[6]
With the exception of China, the communist camp accused the non-socialist
world of ‘pulling’ the
refugees out from Vietnam. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moscow’s official position was that the boat people tragedy
represented a continuation of the Vietnam War. Beijing and Washington
allegedly caused the exodus because of the refusal to recognize the reality
of the ‘new Vietnam.’ China was blamed to have agitated Sino-Vietnamese with
misinformation, and the U.S. was accused of exploiting the exodus to
discredit Socialist Vietnam. Beijing allegedly portrayed the outflow as a
consequence of Hanoi’s ‘racist’ policies
in order to hinder Vietnam’s ideological reconstruction efforts. On the
other hand, Washington deceptively commissioned warships to Southeast Asia
supposedly to help the boat people but, in fact, such a campaign was aimed
at encouraging more illegal escapes in order to promote antagonism among
Asian states to retain the U.S. strategic influence in the region. Moscow
stressed that the only solution to the refugee exodus lied with the
eradication of the Chinese and U.S. propaganda war and ‘pull’
factors.
The United States rejected the Soviet accusation and cited Hanoi’s
human rights violations as the root cause of the boat people tragedy. At the
U.N. conference on Indochinese Asylees in July 1979, Vice President Walter
Mondale asserted that: ‘(Socialist
Vietnam) is failing to ensure the human rights of its people.
Its callous and irresponsible policies are compelling countless
citizens to forsake everything they treasure, to risk their lives, and to
flee into the unknown.’ On the other hand, China
cited Hanoi’s ‘policy of
aggression and war’ as the principal reason leading to the exodus. On
June 16, 1979, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
articulated Beijing’s position: ‘In
the final analysis, the problem of Indochinese refugees has risen solely as
a result of the fact that the Vietnamese government is pursuing a policy of
aggression and war… they press-ganged their young people into serving as
cannon-folder and bled the people white. This has ruined the economy and
made the people destitute. Consequently, large numbers of Vietnamese
inhabitants have had to flee the country.’
While
the superpowers and concerned states debated the cause of the boat people
exodus and blamed each other for the on-going failure to formulate and
implement an effective solution, few actions were undertaken to help
Vietnamese refugees who continued to perish at sea in search of liberty.
Bruce Grant, a diplomat, eloquently described this catastrophic situation in
1979:[7]
‘The story of the boat people exposes power
politics in its most primitive form. While
men and women of goodwill hopefully discuss the prospect in the last quarter
of the twentieth century of a “new world order” or a “common heritage
of mankind,” the boat people have revealed another side – the
ruthless of major powers, the brutality of nation-states, the avarice and
prejudice of people. At times, when telling the story of the boat people, it
seemed that Indochina had become the vortex of all that is wrong with
mankind…
…
The ability of governments of the industrialized democracies to weep
crocodile tears over the boat people, while doing little about the root
causes of the exodus, has been notable. The boat people have indeed made
us all look again at ourselves and at the state of our world.’
Unlike various governments’ phlegmatic reactions fueled by
political calculations, ordinary citizens and non-governmental organizations around the world
were incredibly enthusiastic and wholeheartedly responsive in the campaign
to evacuate and resettle the boat people.
As early as 1977, the Roland
was dispatched by the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP) to
Southeast Asia to rescue refugee boats drifting at sea. Despite the
UNHCR’s characterization of the mission as ‘misguided
philanthropy,’ the WCRP consisted of representatives from all major
religions continued its humanitarian endeavor and eventually evacuated 300
Asylees. Malaysia refused to
allow the Roland to drop off the
refugees; and it took sometime to arrange for resettlement places before the
Asylees could disembark in June 1977. The World Conference on Religion and
Peace was not the only religious organization that commissioned ships to
help the boat people, other notable contributions were from California-based
World Vision International which sent the Seasweep
to assist the encamped Asylees. The Seasweep
was granted permission by Indonesia to ferry the refugees from isolated
coves, where bad weather would effectively cut off their supply, to two
centres on Jemaja Island. In July 1979, the Seasweep
saved numerous refugees who were put on unseaworthy crafts and towed to
international waters by the Malaysian Navy.
In
Europe, Philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre appealed to the French government to
help Vietnamese Asylees: ‘Some of them have not always been on our side, but for the moment we
are not interested in their politics, but in saving their lives.
It’s a moral issue, a question of morality between human beings.’
The boat people tragedy brought many
old adversaries together and facilitated the reconciliation of their
conflicting views. On June 20, 1979, Jean-Paul Sartre smiled at and shook the hand of
his long-time political opponent, Writer Raymond Aron, whose view he
bitterly objected since the Algerian war. Jean-Paul Sartre’s appeal on
behalf of the boat people was joined by many other intellectuals, noticeably
anti-war activist André Glucksmann who later opinionated in his book The
Discourse of War: ‘The Vietnamese refugees are the fall-out of two lines
of warlike discourse… Both stem from Hegel - the communist thesis and the
anti-communist thesis. They
come to the same thing in the end.’
Médecins
du Monde in Paris sent the Ile
de Lumière to the Gulf of Thailand on a rescue mission and to provide
medical care for encamped refugees on Bidong Island in 1979. The Ile
de Lumière’s endeavour was continued by the Alcune
II in 1981, the Le Goela in
1982, the Jean Charcot in 1985,
and then the Rose Schiaffino in
1987.
Under
amounting public pressure, Italy commissioned two Navy cruisers and a supply
vessel to evacuate and resettle up to 1,000 boat people in mid-1979. In West
Germany, Ein Schiff fuer Vietnam (A
Ship for Vietnam Committee)[8]
was incepted in July 1979 and thereafter dispatched the Cap Anamur provided by Hans Voss, a generous benefactor, to the
South China Sea to assist Vietnamese refugees. The German public donated
more than 21 million Deutsche marks to the Cap
Anamur’s humanitarian projects in Southeast Asia. In April 1987, Ein
Schiff fuer Vietnam, renamed Komitee
Cap Anamur, combined its resources with Médecins
du Monde and commissioned the joint French-German Ile
de Lumière II - Cap Anamur III to continue its mission with the
overseas Vietnamese community’s generous financial support.
In
1988, Médecins du Monde with
assistance from the overseas Vietnamese Boat People S.O.S. Committee sent out the Mary Kingston to the Gulf of Thailand to rescue and help the
escaping Asylees. Over the years, the resettled Vietnamese refugee community
tirelessly campaigned on behalf of the defenseless boat people. Countless
events were held by Vietnamese students and other non-profit groups in
Australia, Canada, Europe and the United States to gather donations and
signatures for petitions to support the Asyless in Southeast Asia.
In
North America, the boat people tragedy effectively split the old anti-war
network. Unlike the French peace
activists, notable American leftist intellectuals such as Noam Chomsky and
Frances Fitzgerald were incredibly silent on the Vietnamese refugee issue.
As French philosopher André Glucksmann put it, ‘Today
the communist authorities drown other babies. Yesterday we protested.
Today we are silent,’ with the exception of folk-singer Joan
Baez and 83 other peace activists, most U.S. anti-war intellectuals were
strangely quiescent when it came to the boat people tragedy and Hanoi’s
human rights record.
In
May 1979, Joan Baez published an ‘Open letter to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’ co-signed by
83 other former anti-war activists criticizing Hanoi’s serious violations
of human rights: ‘Thousands of
innocent Vietnamese, many whose only crimes are those of conscience, are
being arrested, detained and tortured in prisons and re-education camps…
Your government has created a painful nightmare that overshadows significant
progress achieved in many areas of Vietnam society.’ In response,
another faction within the former anti-war network quickly voiced its
objection to Baez's letter. William Kunstler labeled Joan Baez a ‘CIA
agent’ while Jane Fonda issued her own statement to denounce Baez: ‘Such
rhetoric only aligns you with the narrow and negative elements in our
country who continue to believe that communism is worse than death.’
During
the initial years of the boat people exodus, however, much of the credits
had to be conferred to the voluntary agency International
Rescue Committee, which worked dedicatedly and diligently to awake the
American conscience to the Indochinese refugee tragedy. In light of
Washington’s lack of leadership, the IRC under Leo Cherne's leadership
formed the Citizens' Commission on Indochinese Refugees in December 1977 to
lobby the U.S. government and Congress to implement a generous policy to
assist and resettle the asylum-seekers.
Following
a fact-finding mission to Southeast Asia in early 1978, the Citizens'
Commission whose membership included many prominent religious, civic and
business leaders urged the U.S. government to admit more boat people while
successfully dispelled fears of public backlash.
The tragic flight of the Vietnamese boat people also attracted
immense international press coverage. While the Times
of London reported on the unknown thousands who perished at sea in early
1978, The New York Times
declared in an editorial that 'Our
Vietnam Duty Is Not Over' and publicly endorsed the Citizens'
Commission's recommendations.
The
African American leadership was also sympathetic to the boat people’s
cause. In a statement published in The New York Times on March 19, 1978, eighty-nine leaders of various
African American organizations such as the National Urban League, the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, etc., called upon the
U.S. Administration and Congress to admit ‘our
Asian brothers and sisters in the refugee camps.’ As a result of these efforts, the White House undertook a
comprehensive review of its policy in this area; and consequently on March
30, 1978, it recommended the admission of up to 25,000 Indochinese refugees
over a period of one year.[9]
Thousands of encamped boat people also benefited greatly from the
charitable services of many overseas Vietnamese and foreigners, one of whom
was a devoted American Catholic priest named Joe Devlin. Father Devlin
volunteered to come to Thailand and worked selflessly for the Asylees in
Songkhla Refugee Camp and other centers.
One of Father Devlin’s noted accomplishments was his establishment
of a day care for unaccompanied children in Songkhla Refugee Camp.[10]
In the words of popular Vietnamese author Nhật Tiến, who
observed the American priest’s affection for the boat people, Father
Devlin ‘shares in the grief, the pains, the distress of a people who
experienced the sudden and violent fall of the entire free Vietnam of the
South.’ Father Joe Devlin was one of countless volunteers who spent
time to help the encamped Asylees in Southeast Asia, and the Vietnamese
people are indebted to their selfless dedication.
[1]
A term coined by France’s Le
Monde, once a staunch supporter of Hanoi’s military cause in South
Vietnam.
[2]
Hanoi’s policy toward Vietnamese refugees was compared to
Hitler’s systematic murder of the Jews by Filipino Foreign Minister
Carlos Romulo, who characterized it as ‘another form of inhumanity, equal in scope and similarly heinous’
to the holocaust, at the ASEAN annual meeting in February 1979. His
Singapore’s counterpart Sinnathamby Rajaratnam publicly characterized
Hanoi’s strategy toward the boat people as
‘a poor man’s alternative to the gas chambers is the open sea.’
[3]
Bruce
Grant, The Boat People: An Age Investigation, Penguin Books, Melbourne
1979.
[4]
Before
Hanoi's organized trade of ship
people was exposed.
[5]
According to Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad.
[6]
Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew even used the ‘pull’
side of the ‘push-pull’ theory to argue that it was cruel
to shelter the arriving boat people because such a welcoming act
would encourage more departures. However, there is also the ‘push’
factor in the ‘push-pull’ theory: the
boat people were forced to leave by Hanoi’s ideological policies.
Any effective strategy to deal with the boat people crisis would have to
take into consideration both factors. (See
Chapter IV on the ‘push-pull’ theory).
[7]
Bruce Grant, The
Boat People: An ‘Age’
Investigation, Penguin Books, Middlesex, England 1979, at
pp.195-197.
[8]
Between
1979 and 1988, over 13,000 Vietnamese boat people were rescued by the Cap
Anamur endeavor.
[9]
This
parole for 25,000 Indochinese refugees was not finalized until June 1978
due to financial constraint.
[10]
Nhat Tien, Duong Phuc, Vu Thanh Thuy, supra,
at p. 93.