III  International Responses to the Boat People Tragedy  

 

Initial Worldwide Reception  

‘A humanitarian problem of historical proportions.’
‘Special statement of the Tokyo Summit on Indochinese refugees’ by Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan,
United States and West Germany.  June 1979


Mother Theresa was among those civic leaders
who publicly appealed to the world to help the boat people.
 

In response to the Vietnamese refugee tragedy, the peoples around the world staged one of the greatest rescue efforts in mankind history. The boat people’s sufferings awoke human conscience and invoked individual compassion in the hearts and minds of citizens around the globe and led them to engage in a massive humanitarian campaign to assist Asylees in Southeast Asia. The boat people’s sufferings also exposed the most inhuman and ugly side of power politics as played out by the superpowers and various governments in their attempt to circumvent international collective obligations. While individual citizens’ endeavor to help the boat people was guided by compassion and humanitarianism, governments’ policies lacked any clear direction and reflected bitter political bickering.

Hanoi’s huge ‘Vietnamese gulag’[1] and ‘policy of genocide’[2] pushed millions of people to attempt seeking asylum overseas. Within eight months following the fall of Saigon, of the unknown Vietnamese escapees, 378 boat persons reached safety. In 1976, the number escalated to 5,569; in July of that year, the UNHCR issued its first appeal to the international community to help the boat people.  A year later, 17,126 Vietnamese asylum-seekers arrived at various ports in Southeast Asia; and that number increased to 87,164 in 1978 and reached its peak at 201,189 in 1979.  Michael Davie, Editor of The Age, asserted in October 1979 that:  ‘.. the boat people are not merely another desperate swarm of “displaced persons,” but the victims and indicators of a profound regional instability.’[3]

        Despite the urgent nature of the boat people tragedy, however, most governments’ pre-1979 reaction[4] was apathetic due to lack of leadership that was often provided by the United States during major humanitarian crises. The Wall Street Journal characterized this indifferent response to the Indochinese refugee tragedy during the early years as ‘a scandal in the house of decent men.’ The U.S. phlegmatic policy reflected the then ‘no more Vietnam’ attitude after the fall of Saigon in 1975. Washington adopted an ad hoc policy with no clear direction in dealing with Southeast Asian Asylee issue. 

The U.S. Attorney General exercised his parole power designed for emergencies to admit and resettle the boat people. However, as the number of Vietnamese refugees increased, the newly-elected Carter Administration felt compelled to request additional parole authorizations even though the former Ford cabinet had indicated to Congress that the May 1976 parole for Indochinese refugees (mainly for Laotians) would be the last. The additional August 1977 parole for 7,000 Vietnamese and 8,000 Laotians could not cope with the continuing increase in the number of arriving boat people. And thus, on January 25, 1978, a new parole was again announced by the U.S. Attorney General.

Notwithstanding the volcanic magnitude of the Indochinese refugee crisis, the U.S. government failed to develop an unambiguous policy to deal with this new and urgent development in Southeast Asia. The American lack of leadership led other governments to the same path in dealing with Indochinese Asylees. Washington wanted to internationalize the boat people issue so that other nations would jointly assist in the resettlement process; however, the U.S. lack of enthusiasm and halfhearted reception of refugees caused other nations to react in a similar fashion. Most governments were reluctant to get involved in what they viewed initially as an American problem brought about by the U.S. betrayal of its ally, South Vietnam. Therefore, by the early 1978, most nations had not resettled one single boat person; and the unsettled refugees quickly became a residual problem for first-asylum countries, which wanted assurance that ‘every single refugee would be resettled within a reasonable time.’[5] The apathetic government response during the initial years of the exodus eventually led to adverse consequences, including the first-asylum countries’ decision to withdraw their offer of temporary shelters for the boat people and to prolong the refugees’ detention prior to resettlement purposely to discourage potential Asylees from leaving Socialist Vietnam.[6]

            With the exception of China, the communist camp accused the non-socialist world of ‘pulling’ the refugees out from Vietnam. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moscow’s official position was that the boat people tragedy represented a continuation of the Vietnam War. Beijing and Washington allegedly caused the exodus because of the refusal to recognize the reality of the ‘new Vietnam.’  China was blamed to have agitated Sino-Vietnamese with misinformation, and the U.S. was accused of exploiting the exodus to discredit Socialist Vietnam. Beijing allegedly portrayed the outflow as a consequence of Hanoi’s ‘racist’ policies in order to hinder Vietnam’s ideological reconstruction efforts. On the other hand, Washington deceptively commissioned warships to Southeast Asia supposedly to help the boat people but, in fact, such a campaign was aimed at encouraging more illegal escapes in order to promote antagonism among Asian states to retain the U.S. strategic influence in the region. Moscow stressed that the only solution to the refugee exodus lied with the eradication of the Chinese and U.S. propaganda war and ‘pull’ factors.

            The United States rejected the Soviet accusation and cited Hanoi’s human rights violations as the root cause of the boat people tragedy. At the U.N. conference on Indochinese Asylees in July 1979, Vice President Walter Mondale asserted that: ‘(Socialist Vietnam) is failing to ensure the human rights of its people.  Its callous and irresponsible policies are compelling countless citizens to forsake everything they treasure, to risk their lives, and to flee into the unknown.’ On the other hand, China cited Hanoi’s ‘policy of aggression and war’ as the principal reason leading to the exodus. On June 16, 1979, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs articulated Beijing’s position: ‘In the final analysis, the problem of Indochinese refugees has risen solely as a result of the fact that the Vietnamese government is pursuing a policy of aggression and war… they press-ganged their young people into serving as cannon-folder and bled the people white. This has ruined the economy and made the people destitute. Consequently, large numbers of Vietnamese inhabitants have had to flee the country.’

While the superpowers and concerned states debated the cause of the boat people exodus and blamed each other for the on-going failure to formulate and implement an effective solution, few actions were undertaken to help Vietnamese refugees who continued to perish at sea in search of liberty. Bruce Grant, a diplomat, eloquently described this catastrophic situation in 1979:[7]

        ‘The story of the boat people exposes power politics in its most primitive form.  While men and women of goodwill hopefully discuss the prospect in the last quarter of the twentieth century of a “new world order” or a “common heritage of mankind,” the boat people have revealed another side – the ruthless of major powers, the brutality of nation-states, the avarice and prejudice of people. At times, when telling the story of the boat people, it seemed that Indochina had become the vortex of all that is wrong with mankind

… The ability of governments of the industrialized democracies to weep crocodile tears over the boat people, while doing little about the root causes of the exodus, has been notable. The boat people have indeed made us all look again at ourselves and at the state of our world.’

            Unlike various governments’ phlegmatic reactions fueled by political calculations, ordinary citizens and non-governmental organizations around the world were incredibly enthusiastic and wholeheartedly responsive in the campaign to evacuate and resettle the boat people.  As early as 1977, the Roland was dispatched by the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP) to Southeast Asia to rescue refugee boats drifting at sea. Despite the UNHCR’s characterization of the mission as ‘misguided philanthropy,’ the WCRP consisted of representatives from all major religions continued its humanitarian endeavor and eventually evacuated 300 Asylees.  Malaysia refused to allow the Roland to drop off the refugees; and it took sometime to arrange for resettlement places before the Asylees could disembark in June 1977. The World Conference on Religion and Peace was not the only religious organization that commissioned ships to help the boat people, other notable contributions were from California-based World Vision International which sent the Seasweep to assist the encamped Asylees. The Seasweep was granted permission by Indonesia to ferry the refugees from isolated coves, where bad weather would effectively cut off their supply, to two centres on Jemaja Island. In July 1979, the Seasweep saved numerous refugees who were put on unseaworthy crafts and towed to international waters by the Malaysian Navy.

In Europe, Philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre appealed to the French government to help Vietnamese Asylees: ‘Some of them have not always been on our side, but for the moment we are not interested in their politics, but in saving their lives.  It’s a moral issue, a question of morality between human beings.’ The boat people tragedy brought many old adversaries together and facilitated the reconciliation of their conflicting views. On June 20, 1979, Jean-Paul Sartre smiled at and shook the hand of his long-time political opponent, Writer Raymond Aron, whose view he bitterly objected since the Algerian war. Jean-Paul Sartre’s appeal on behalf of the boat people was joined by many other intellectuals, noticeably anti-war activist André Glucksmann who later opinionated in his book The Discourse of War: ‘The Vietnamese refugees are the fall-out of two lines of warlike discourse… Both stem from Hegel - the communist thesis and the anti-communist thesis.  They come to the same thing in the end.’

Médecins du Monde in Paris sent the Ile de Lumière to the Gulf of Thailand on a rescue mission and to provide medical care for encamped refugees on Bidong Island in 1979. The Ile de Lumière’s endeavour was continued by the Alcune II in 1981, the Le Goela in 1982, the Jean Charcot in 1985, and then the Rose Schiaffino in 1987.

Under amounting public pressure, Italy commissioned two Navy cruisers and a supply vessel to evacuate and resettle up to 1,000 boat people in mid-1979. In West Germany, Ein Schiff fuer Vietnam (A Ship for Vietnam Committee)[8] was incepted in July 1979 and thereafter dispatched the Cap Anamur provided by Hans Voss, a generous benefactor, to the South China Sea to assist Vietnamese refugees. The German public donated more than 21 million Deutsche marks to the Cap Anamur’s humanitarian projects in Southeast Asia. In April 1987, Ein Schiff fuer Vietnam, renamed Komitee Cap Anamur, combined its resources with Médecins du Monde and commissioned the joint French-German Ile de Lumière II - Cap Anamur III to continue its mission with the overseas Vietnamese community’s generous financial support.

In 1988, Médecins du Monde with assistance from the overseas Vietnamese Boat People S.O.S. Committee sent out the Mary Kingston to the Gulf of Thailand to rescue and help the escaping Asylees. Over the years, the resettled Vietnamese refugee community tirelessly campaigned on behalf of the defenseless boat people. Countless events were held by Vietnamese students and other non-profit groups in Australia, Canada, Europe and the United States to gather donations and signatures for petitions to support the Asyless in Southeast Asia.

In North America, the boat people tragedy effectively split the old anti-war network. Unlike the French peace activists, notable American leftist intellectuals such as Noam Chomsky and Frances Fitzgerald were incredibly silent on the Vietnamese refugee issue. As French philosopher André Glucksmann put it, ‘Today the communist authorities drown other babies. Yesterday we protested.  Today we are silent,’ with the exception of folk-singer Joan Baez and 83 other peace activists, most U.S. anti-war intellectuals were strangely quiescent when it came to the boat people tragedy and Hanoi’s human rights record. 

In May 1979, Joan Baez published an ‘Open letter to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam’ co-signed by 83 other former anti-war activists criticizing Hanoi’s serious violations of human rights: ‘Thousands of innocent Vietnamese, many whose only crimes are those of conscience, are being arrested, detained and tortured in prisons and re-education camps… Your government has created a painful nightmare that overshadows significant progress achieved in many areas of Vietnam society.’ In response, another faction within the former anti-war network quickly voiced its objection to Baez's letter. William Kunstler labeled Joan Baez a ‘CIA agent’ while Jane Fonda issued her own statement to denounce Baez: ‘Such rhetoric only aligns you with the narrow and negative elements in our country who continue to believe that communism is worse than death.’

During the initial years of the boat people exodus, however, much of the credits had to be conferred to the voluntary agency International Rescue Committee, which worked dedicatedly and diligently to awake the American conscience to the Indochinese refugee tragedy. In light of Washington’s lack of leadership, the IRC under Leo Cherne's leadership formed the Citizens' Commission on Indochinese Refugees in December 1977 to lobby the U.S. government and Congress to implement a generous policy to assist and resettle the asylum-seekers. 

Following a fact-finding mission to Southeast Asia in early 1978, the Citizens' Commission whose membership included many prominent religious, civic and business leaders urged the U.S. government to admit more boat people while successfully dispelled fears of public backlash.  The tragic flight of the Vietnamese boat people also attracted immense international press coverage. While the Times of London reported on the unknown thousands who perished at sea in early 1978, The New York Times declared in an editorial that 'Our Vietnam Duty Is Not Over' and publicly endorsed the Citizens' Commission's recommendations. 

The African American leadership was also sympathetic to the boat people’s cause. In a statement published in The New York Times on March 19, 1978, eighty-nine leaders of various African American organizations such as the National Urban League, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, etc., called upon the U.S. Administration and Congress to admit ‘our Asian brothers and sisters in the refugee camps.’  As a result of these efforts, the White House undertook a comprehensive review of its policy in this area; and consequently on March 30, 1978, it recommended the admission of up to 25,000 Indochinese refugees over a period of one year.[9]

            Thousands of encamped boat people also benefited greatly from the charitable services of many overseas Vietnamese and foreigners, one of whom was a devoted American Catholic priest named Joe Devlin. Father Devlin volunteered to come to Thailand and worked selflessly for the Asylees in Songkhla Refugee Camp and other centers.  One of Father Devlin’s noted accomplishments was his establishment of a day care for unaccompanied children in Songkhla Refugee Camp.[10] In the words of popular Vietnamese author Nhật Tiến, who observed the American priest’s affection for the boat people, Father Devlin ‘shares in the grief, the pains, the distress of a people who experienced the sudden and violent fall of the entire free Vietnam of the South.’ Father Joe Devlin was one of countless volunteers who spent time to help the encamped Asylees in Southeast Asia, and the Vietnamese people are indebted to their selfless dedication.


[1]  A term coined by France’s Le Monde, once a staunch supporter of Hanoi’s military cause in South Vietnam.  

[2]  Hanoi’s policy toward Vietnamese refugees was compared to Hitler’s systematic murder of the Jews by Filipino Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo, who characterized it as ‘another form of inhumanity, equal in scope and similarly heinous’ to the holocaust, at the ASEAN annual meeting in February 1979. His Singapore’s counterpart Sinnathamby Rajaratnam publicly characterized Hanoi’s strategy toward the boat people as ‘a poor man’s alternative to the gas chambers is the open sea.’  

[3]   Bruce Grant, The Boat People: An Age Investigation, Penguin Books, Melbourne 1979.  

[4]  Before Hanoi's organized trade of ship people was exposed.  

[5] According to Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad.  

[6]   Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew even used the ‘pull’ side of the ‘push-pull’ theory to argue that it was cruel to shelter the arriving boat people because such a welcoming act would encourage more departures. However, there is also the ‘push’ factor in the ‘push-pull’ theory: the boat people were forced to leave by Hanoi’s ideological policies. Any effective strategy to deal with the boat people crisis would have to take into consideration both factors. (See Chapter IV on the ‘push-pull’ theory).  

[7]  Bruce Grant, The Boat People:  An ‘Age’ Investigation, Penguin Books, Middlesex, England 1979, at pp.195-197.  

[8]   Between 1979 and 1988, over 13,000 Vietnamese boat people were rescued by the Cap Anamur endeavor. 

[9]   This parole for 25,000 Indochinese refugees was not finalized until June 1978 due to financial constraint.  

[10]  Nhat Tien, Duong Phuc, Vu Thanh Thuy, supra, at p. 93.  

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