III International Responses to the Boat People Tragedy
Hanoi’s Trade in Human Misery

‘Ship people’
were crammed into Hanoi’s rusty vessels
and sent out to neighboring states.
The
Communist Party of Vietnam's post-1975 policy, as previously discussed in Chapter
I, was to isolate and expel between 2 million to 3 million Vietnamese of
diverse backgrounds in order for the new regime to achieve political
stability in the South. Hanoi’s Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hiền
told the Swedish delegation to the U.N. conference on Indochinese refugees
in Geneva in July 1979 that some 3 million South Vietnamese, who had become
accustomed to political freedom and economic autonomy, might have to leave
Socialist Vietnam; and this position was confirmed later by Foreign Minister
Nguyễn Cơ Thạch in
a UPI interview
in August 1979 (up
to 3 million would escape ‘depending on the political situation’)[1]
and during a discussion with Daniel K. Akaka, a member of the U.S. House
of Representatives delegation headed by Benjamin Rosenthal visiting Hanoi
for two days in 1979.
During
the implementation stage of this inhumane policy, beside relaxing border
patrol and disseminating misinformation to induce dissidents to leave, the
Communist Party also recognized in early 1978 that the regime could get at
the hidden assets of affluent Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese by arranging and
guaranteeing safe passages to freedom for them. Dazzled by the South
Vietnamese wealth uncovered during two previous raids on the private sector,
the communist leaders in Hanoi hastily ordered the Interior Ministry to work
with international racketeers to organize human cargoes to be freighted out
in exchange for gold and hard currencies.
Hanoi's
trade in human misery reserved its privileged exit permits for ethnic
Chinese.[2]
Affluent Vietnamese were required to pay much higher prices for access to
government-guaranteed safe passages to freedom. Project ‘freedom for sale’ was born out of greed and during a period
wherein various Southeast Asian governments such as Malaysia and Thailand
pronounced a policy of tolerance that would accept to shelter all
asylum-seekers on humanitarian grounds; one of the factors that induced the
new compassionate policy was international public outcry over the pirates'
brutal attacks on the helpless boat people.
The
12-month period between the fall of 1978 and mid-July 1979 witnessed, along
with the endless 'illegal' exodus,
Hanoi’s involvement in shipping out human cargoes of ethnic Chinese and
affluent Vietnamese in a tightly controlled but poorly executed scheme.[3]
In June 1979, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Sinnathamby Rajaratnam accused
Vietnamese communists of having ‘picked
on’ Chinese Vietnamese ‘because
they know that almost all ASEAN countries have delicate problems with their
Chinese minorities. The massive
unloading of Chinese refugees onto these countries can only exacerbate
racial sensitivities and, if the flow is sustained long enough, lead to
racial warfare which could tear these societies apart quicker and far more
effectively than any invading Vietnamese army.
In no time ASEAN prosperity, stability and cohesion would vanish
into thin air and conditions of life would soon be on par with those now
prevailing in Indochina.’
Hanoi's
Interior Ministry was actively involved in organizing human cargoes to be
freighted out in 1978 and 1979. Its
plain clothed officers retained the service of civilian agents as
intermediaries to recruit Chinese passengers and wealthy Vietnamese for
Hanoi’s ‘freedom for sale’
project. Ethnic Vietnamese were
charged higher exit fees (as high as
50% more) than the fares paid by Chinese voyagers. Hanoi-sponsored
departures took place in many locations including Long Thành, Ðà
Nẳng, hảI Phòng, Rạch Giá, Trà Vinh and Vĩnh Long.
When the CPV’s ‘freedom
for sale’ project was in full operation, the regime began to clam down
hard on non-official or so-called ‘illegal
escapes’ in order to secure its profitable monopoly in the refugee
trade.[4]
Before
Hanoi began to collaborate with overseas Chinese racketeers to ‘traffic
in human misery’[5]
in mid-1978, almost all boat people who arrived safely at any port could
request assistance and a temporary shelter pending resettlement with little
resistance from the local communities.[6]
In fact, many neighboring villagers opened their arms and heart to assist
Vietnamese asylum-seekers with compassion. However, all this quickly changed
as soon as Hanoi organized the shipments of ethnic Chinese on huge ships in
exchange for gold and hard currencies. The
ethnic-Chinese or ship people
factor began to emerge in mid-1978 and magnified the complexity of the
Vietnamese boat people crisis.
As
a consequence of Hanoi’s sanctioned ship
people phenomenon, the neighboring communities and governments became
antagonistic and subsequently treated all arriving boat people with serious
hostility. Refugees from Socialist Vietnam, whose composition included about
a quarter of ethnic Chinese,[7]
were no longer offered assistance and direction by the local people who
historically resented the Chinese presence in their countries. And worse,
there were many instances, especially in Malaysia, in which the boat people
were stoned and beaten by the local villagers. The number of Vietnamese
escapes, however, did not cease but continued to rise despite the high risks
of death at sea, of rape and pillage by pirates, and the maltreatment
administered by neighboring states. In the New Year message for 1979,
Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew appealed to leaders around the
globe to ‘register their outrage’
at Hanoi’s trade in human misery.
‘The latest exodus of “boat people” and “ship people” is the
result of acts of cold calculation, measured in gold, and long after the
heat of battle has cooled. What is ominous is that unless world leaders and
leader-writers register their outrage at this cynical disposal of unwanted
citizens, many more victims will be sent off on packed boats or ships.’

In December 1978, the rusty Huey
Fong commissioned by
the Vietnamese communist
regime and piloted by
international
(Hong
Kong Government Information Services)
[1]
UPI
report. Quoted in Barry
Wain’s ‘The Refused:
The Agony of the Indochina Refugees,’ supra, at p.231.
[2]
This
priority was set partly due to the on-going conflict between Hanoi and
Beijing at that time. Hanoi
was undoubtedly skeptical about a potential fifth column, but greed was
the real cause that gave rise to project 'freedom
for sale.'
[3]
There was a serious lack of coordination in the implementation of
Hanoi’s ‘freedom for sale’
project at the local level. Almost all boats were required to carry more
than the officially endorsed number of passengers; and many organized
departures were intercepted by different regional security offices,
whose cadres quickly took advantage of the lawless situation and robed
the passengers of their valuables.
[4]
According
to Foreign Minister
Nguyễn Cơ Thạch's remark
to the
visiting U.S. House of Representatives mission headed by Benjamin S.
Rosenthal in early August 1979, Hanoi successfully prosecuted 4,000
cases of illegal escapes during the first 7 months of 1979 (at
the peak of Hanoi's export of human cargoes).
This assertion translated into tens of thousands of prisoners,
who were caught during their failed escapes, because most unofficial
secret escapes could rarely involve more than a few dozen
asylum-seekers.
[5]
A
phrase coined by Hong Kong's Chief Secretary Sir Jack Cater ('those
who traffic in human misery').
[6]
Before Hanoi’s trade in human
misery in mid-1978, Malaysia and Thailand occasionally turned
refugee boats away but often allowed landing for most boat people on
unseaworthy crafts; and in reality, the majority of refugee boats from
Socialist Vietnam were unseaworthy. The temporary first-asylum policy
was greatly appreciated by the boat people in light of the fact that in
the 1970s, no country in Southeast Asia was a signatory to the 1951
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or
the 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees. (The Philippines ratified these
documents in July 1981, and consequently its treatment of Vietnamese
Asylees in the late 1980s was slightly better than that of neighboring
states.)
[7]
Bruce B. Dunning, Vietnamese in America: The Adaptation of the 1975-1979 Arrivals, in Refugees
As Immigrants, Edi. by David W. Haines, Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc., New Jersey 1989, at p.60.
Furthermore, most Sino-Vietnamese or ship
people left in larger crafts and old foreign-registered ships
operated by overseas Chinese racketeers under contract with Hanoi
between mid-1978 and late 1979.