III  International Responses to the Boat People Tragedy

 

Hanoi’s Trade in Human Misery



‘Ship people’ were crammed into Hanoi’s rusty vessels
and sent out to neighboring states.

The Communist Party of Vietnam's post-1975 policy, as previously discussed in Chapter I, was to isolate and expel between 2 million to 3 million Vietnamese of diverse backgrounds in order for the new regime to achieve political stability in the South. Hanoi’s Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hiền told the Swedish delegation to the U.N. conference on Indochinese refugees in Geneva in July 1979 that some 3 million South Vietnamese, who had become accustomed to political freedom and economic autonomy, might have to leave Socialist Vietnam; and this position was confirmed later by Foreign Minister Nguyễn Cơ Thạch in a UPI interview in August 1979 (up to 3 million would escape ‘depending on the political situation’)[1] and during a discussion with Daniel K. Akaka, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives delegation headed by Benjamin Rosenthal visiting Hanoi for two days in 1979.

During the implementation stage of this inhumane policy, beside relaxing border patrol and disseminating misinformation to induce dissidents to leave, the Communist Party also recognized in early 1978 that the regime could get at the hidden assets of affluent Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese by arranging and guaranteeing safe passages to freedom for them. Dazzled by the South Vietnamese wealth uncovered during two previous raids on the private sector, the communist leaders in Hanoi hastily ordered the Interior Ministry to work with international racketeers to organize human cargoes to be freighted out in exchange for gold and hard currencies. 

Hanoi's trade in human misery reserved its privileged exit permits for ethnic Chinese.[2] Affluent Vietnamese were required to pay much higher prices for access to government-guaranteed safe passages to freedom. Project ‘freedom for sale’ was born out of greed and during a period wherein various Southeast Asian governments such as Malaysia and Thailand pronounced a policy of tolerance that would accept to shelter all asylum-seekers on humanitarian grounds; one of the factors that induced the new compassionate policy was international public outcry over the pirates' brutal attacks on the helpless boat people.

The 12-month period between the fall of 1978 and mid-July 1979 witnessed, along with the endless 'illegal' exodus, Hanoi’s involvement in shipping out human cargoes of ethnic Chinese and affluent Vietnamese in a tightly controlled but poorly executed scheme.[3] In June 1979, Singapore’s Foreign Minister Sinnathamby Rajaratnam accused Vietnamese communists of having ‘picked on’ Chinese Vietnamese ‘because they know that almost all ASEAN countries have delicate problems with their Chinese minorities.  The massive unloading of Chinese refugees onto these countries can only exacerbate racial sensitivities and, if the flow is sustained long enough, lead to racial warfare which could tear these societies apart quicker and far more effectively than any invading Vietnamese army.  In no time ASEAN prosperity, stability and cohesion would vanish into thin air and conditions of life would soon be on par with those now prevailing in Indochina.’

Hanoi's Interior Ministry was actively involved in organizing human cargoes to be freighted out in 1978 and 1979.  Its plain clothed officers retained the service of civilian agents as intermediaries to recruit Chinese passengers and wealthy Vietnamese for Hanoi’s ‘freedom for sale’ project.  Ethnic Vietnamese were charged higher exit fees (as high as 50% more) than the fares paid by Chinese voyagers. Hanoi-sponsored departures took place in many locations including Long Thành, Ðà Nẳng, hảI Phòng, Rạch Giá, Trà Vinh and Vĩnh Long. When the CPV’s  ‘freedom for sale’ project was in full operation, the regime began to clam down hard on non-official or so-called ‘illegal escapes’ in order to secure its profitable monopoly in the refugee trade.[4]

Before Hanoi began to collaborate with overseas Chinese racketeers to ‘traffic in human misery’[5] in mid-1978, almost all boat people who arrived safely at any port could request assistance and a temporary shelter pending resettlement with little resistance from the local communities.[6] In fact, many neighboring villagers opened their arms and heart to assist Vietnamese asylum-seekers with compassion. However, all this quickly changed as soon as Hanoi organized the shipments of ethnic Chinese on huge ships in exchange for gold and hard currencies. The ethnic-Chinese or ship people factor began to emerge in mid-1978 and magnified the complexity of the Vietnamese boat people crisis.

As a consequence of Hanoi’s sanctioned ship people phenomenon, the neighboring communities and governments became antagonistic and subsequently treated all arriving boat people with serious hostility. Refugees from Socialist Vietnam, whose composition included about a quarter of ethnic Chinese,[7] were no longer offered assistance and direction by the local people who historically resented the Chinese presence in their countries. And worse, there were many instances, especially in Malaysia, in which the boat people were stoned and beaten by the local villagers. The number of Vietnamese escapes, however, did not cease but continued to rise despite the high risks of death at sea, of rape and pillage by pirates, and the maltreatment administered by neighboring states. In the New Year message for 1979, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew appealed to leaders around the globe to ‘register their outrage’ at Hanoi’s trade in human misery.

            ‘The latest exodus of “boat people” and “ship people” is the result of acts of cold calculation, measured in gold, and long after the heat of battle has cooled. What is ominous is that unless world leaders and leader-writers register their outrage at this cynical disposal of unwanted citizens, many more victims will be sent off on packed boats or ships.’


In December 1978, the rusty Huey Fong commissioned by
the Vietnamese  communist  regime  and piloted by international 
(Hong Kong Government Information Services)

 

[1]   UPI report.  Quoted in Barry Wain’s ‘The Refused:  The Agony of the Indochina Refugees,’ supra, at p.231.  

[2]  This priority was set partly due to the on-going conflict between Hanoi and Beijing at that time.  Hanoi was undoubtedly skeptical about a potential fifth column, but greed was the real cause that gave rise to project 'freedom for sale.'  

[3] There was a serious lack of coordination in the implementation of Hanoi’s ‘freedom for sale’ project at the local level. Almost all boats were required to carry more than the officially endorsed number of passengers; and many organized departures were intercepted by different regional security offices, whose cadres quickly took advantage of the lawless situation and robed the passengers of their valuables.  

[4]  According to Foreign Minister Nguyễn Cơ Thạch's remark to the visiting U.S. House of Representatives mission headed by Benjamin S. Rosenthal in early August 1979, Hanoi successfully prosecuted 4,000 cases of illegal escapes during the first 7 months of 1979 (at the peak of Hanoi's export of human cargoes).  This assertion translated into tens of thousands of prisoners, who were caught during their failed escapes, because most unofficial secret escapes could rarely involve more than a few dozen asylum-seekers.  

[5]  A phrase coined by Hong Kong's Chief Secretary Sir Jack Cater ('those who traffic in human misery').  

[6] Before Hanoi’s trade in human misery in mid-1978, Malaysia and Thailand occasionally turned refugee boats away but often allowed landing for most boat people on unseaworthy crafts; and in reality, the majority of refugee boats from Socialist Vietnam were unseaworthy. The temporary first-asylum policy was greatly appreciated by the boat people in light of the fact that in the 1970s, no country in Southeast Asia was a signatory to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or  the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. (The Philippines ratified these documents in July 1981, and consequently its treatment of Vietnamese Asylees in the late 1980s was slightly better than that of neighboring states.)  

[7]  Bruce B. Dunning, Vietnamese in America: The Adaptation of the 1975-1979 Arrivals, in Refugees As Immigrants, Edi. by David W. Haines, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., New Jersey 1989, at p.60.  Furthermore, most Sino-Vietnamese or ship people left in larger crafts and old foreign-registered ships operated by overseas Chinese racketeers under contract with Hanoi between mid-1978 and late 1979.


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